Pieter's Blog

                                                      Viruses and politics are not my friends

There has been a rather strange exchange of views in the media recently about a possible disease threat to the Gir Forest lions in India. The Times of India reported that a dead lion tested positive with Peste des Petits Ruminants Virus (PPRV). The article mentioned that PPRV is related to Canine Distemper Virus (CDV) that killed about 1000 lions in the Serengeti in Tanzania in 1994.  

The Times of India mentioned that this case was significant for the future survival of the unique lions in the Gir Forest – a small remnant of what once was a widespread lion population occurring in Europe, the Middle East, Persia, Afghanistan and India. It was mentioned that further investigations would be forthcoming, involving the Royal Veterinary College in the UK and the Wildlife Institute of India. 

There was an almost immediate response by the Chief Wildlife Warden of Gujarat Province, C.N. Pandey. He said there was little cause for concern, and correctly pointed out that the PPRV case involved a lion that died in 2007 of trypanosomiasis, a disease spread by biting flies. The research paper describing the presence of PPRV in tissues of the lion was published in 2012, and Mr Pandey reported that no lions in the Gir population had been diagnosed with symptoms or pathology of PPRV at any time. 

The Royal Veterinary College will send Dr Richard Kock to India in September. He will coordinate with Wildlife Insitute in collecting blood samples from the Gir lions to determine PPRV antibody presence and to determine whether live virus can be isolated from further lions. 

Nevertheless, questions remain. It should be noted that the Supreme Court in India recently ordered Gujarat Province to provide lions to an alternative location in Madhja Pradesh Province. Part of the evidence considered by the court was the possibility that the single remaining population of Asiatic lions, if kept in one location (the Gir Forest), would be highly susceptible to decimation by disease outbreaks. Gujarat Province objected and is appealing the decision partly on the basis that the Gir lions bring considerable unique tourism income that would be lost by sending some lions to other locations. Conservation precautions arguing for establishment of lions in more than one location from biosecurity concerns have thus run headlong into a political argument, and the digging up of this PPRV occurrence was seen as scaremongering.

That could well be true. PPRV infects small ruminants – goats and sheep primarily. Antibodies have been found in camels and gazelles, although pathology similar to that of infected sheep and goats has not been described. PPRV is part of a family of morbilliviruses that includes canine distemper among a wide range of carnivore species, measles in humans, rinderpest in cattle, phocine morbillivirus among seals and porpoise distemper virus. PPRV is not known to cause disease among carnivores, and similar incidental and non-pathogenic occurrence of a variety of viruses among carnivores has been described. For example, my research has shown that African carnivores can test positive for bluetongue virus, African horsesickness, Rift Valley fever etc. All of which diseases that do not affect carnivores, yet they show up on their blood profiles. One must be careful in “over-interpreting” results.  

I nevertheless urge that diseases among and threatening highly endangered species should be carefully monitored. Gir lions occur in close proximity to domestic dogs, a species integrally implicated in the spread of CDV to lions and other wild carnivores in Africa with disastrous consequences. It is hopeful that blood samples taken from Gir lions will be analysed for a diversity of diseases that could realistically threaten these unique and vulnerable animals - in which case this PPRV conundrum could have a good outcome. And highly endangered species should not be kept in one location where they could be highly susceptible to chance events like disease outbreaks, forest fires and hurricanes. 

Picture credit: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Asiatic_Lion_Male.jpg

                                                              Wonder where our horns went?

In August 2012, TRAFFIC published an exhaustive report (The South Africa-Vietnam Rhino Horn Trade Nexus: A deadly combination of institutional lapses, corrupt wildlife industry professionals and Asian crime syndicates. 2012, TRAFFIC, Johannesburg, South Africa) on the trade, legal and illegal, of rhino products between South Africa and Vietnam. Written by Tom Milliken and others, it contains a great deal of information about the trade, and also allows an evaluation of how the private rhino owners have profited from the legal, pseudo-legal, and illegal aspects. Since many of these owners are pushing hard to have the trade in rhino horn legalized, it is perhaps worth looking at the trade in rhinos over the past years to get a better understanding of how the system works. 

A short summary of private rhino ownership

South Africa’s growth in game ranching has been termed a “conservation revolution” in that about 17% of the total land area is now used for wildlife ranching of some description (versus 6% of land set aside as national and provincial protected areas). Such ranching produces considerable economic benefits and game ranches are primarily business ventures engaged in hunting for meat and trophies, wildlife viewing, and live sales domestically and abroad. Indeed, by 2007 it was estimated that about 18.5 million game animals existed to be utilized on about 9,000 ranches. 

Private ownership of white rhinos is seen as contributing to the overall conservation success in terms of the great increase in white rhino numbers in South Africa. Indeed, of the estimated total of 18,800 white rhinos in the country, it is estimated that almost 5,000 are in private hands. With a policy of increasing white rhino numbers versus limited state lands on which to house them, the continued growth of the white rhino population is seen to integrally depend on placing rhinos in private hands. Before the poaching crisis began, necessitating significant outlays by private owners to protect their rhinos, white rhino ownership was a very attractive proposition earning considerable revenue via live sales, trophy hunting and some ecotourism ventures. 

In fact, the TRAFFIC report indicates that when the Natal Parks Board began sales of rhinos to private owners, it was at a fixed price of about $900. During the same time, a trophy hunt could bring in as much as $15,000 – resulting in the inevitable trend that about 10% of rhinos bought on auction were almost immediately trophy hunted. 

Perhaps realizing that wild rhinos captured from the wild were undervalued, the Natal Parks Board then went for auctions, and immediately gained much higher profits. Looking at prices from 1987 to 1991, rhinos were then sold for an average of $15,163. This rose to an average price of $30,307 between 2007-2010. The auction price of a rhino is determined by a number of factors, but largely is influenced by age and the size of the horn. Nevertheless, profits remained very robust for those who bought rhinos and then sold them to hunters – in 2010 the difference between the average auction price and the average hunt price was $29,235.  That is still a minimum profit, as it does not include what a hunter would pay for extras like accommodation and daily rates while on the hunt. 

The TRAFFIC report does not distinguish between rhinos auctioned by the state and private auctions, but indicates that between 1986 and 2010, a total of 2,982 rhinos went on the block. The report only mentions that between 2005 and 2008 a total of 821 rhinos were auctioned, 581 of which came from wild populations owned by the state, or about 70%. Keeping that formula, the total numbers auctioned between the ten years 2001 to 2010 was 1,976 rhinos, indicating that 1,383 came from the wild. The numbers of rhinos trophy hunted between the ten years 2002 to 2011, judging by trophy and horn exports listed by CITES, amounted to 1,885.

In short, it is a strange way of conserving rhinos in my opinion. The rhino owners presumably compete with each other during auctions, but the hunt price always stays well above the auction price. Whenever the auction price approaches anything near the hunt price, the amount of money demanded to hunt a rhino jumps up again – the TRAFFIC report clearly shows such adjustments in 1989, 2001 and 2008, with that last surge in prices coinciding almost exactly with a surge in demand from Vietnamese and proxy “pseudo-hunters” cynically allowed to hunt rhinos though many had no familiarity with firearms. 

With the state willing to sell large numbers of wild rhinos on auction, there is little need for private owners to spend money to raise them – buy them at a low price and arrange trophy hunts soon after (one source says a matter of weeks) the sale is made. While the introduction of auctions rather than fixed-price sales cut into profits for private rhino owners in the short term, the difference of $29,235 in 2010 between average auction price and average hunt price stands at an all-time high. The entire nature of the concept of private rhino ownership seems in fact against conservation as the rhinos are merely commodities always to be traded for the highest profit margins.

Perhaps also important is that the state has willingly entered into this covenant, supposedly selling off “surplus” wild rhinos (largely males) to fund conservation activities, especially in light of less and less money coming from central government. Proponents of these state sales have also said that managing rhino populations by selling off surplus males allows more reproduction to take place in protected areas. This begs the question of why protected areas with rhinos already at a stable level -  through natural population regulation -  should want intrusive management to make more rhinos? How many rhinos does South Africa want? Or is the state also seeing rhinos as a commodity to be reproductively manipulated for greater profits? It is all seeming like rhino “conservation” is influenced at all levels by commercial formulas. While the TRAFFIC report suggested that few if any rhinos would be sold by Kruger in 2012, the actual number sold is not yet available. It would be highly controversial if Kruger continues to sell rhinos to be shot as trophies considering that between 2011 and today, a total of 906 rhinos have been poached from the park.  

How many rhinos are in private hands and how many horns are in private stockpiles?

Strangely, neither number is known. The TRAFFIC report mentions this:

“The carrying out of this survey [of rhinos in private hands] has been fraught with frustration and endless delays. The level of cooperation afforded by many individual owners of white rhinoceroses, their managers, the provincial and national authorities has been disappointing. The professional hunters and individuals involved with hunting were particularly unhelpful. Much of the official co-operation was grudging at best and many owners and management authority officials refused outright to provide information when requested."

That’s pretty surprising for a bunch of people supposedly involved in ensuring conservation of white rhinos? I suppose the excuse could be that private rhino owners did not want to reveal their rhino stocks in fear of poaching, but unless such information is available, how can there ever be an assessment of whether the private rhino owners are actually contributing to rhino conservation or just utilizing rhinos for short-term profit? 

The other big gap in information concerns rhino horn stockpiles. Some of these are held by authorities of national and provincial protected areas and represent accumulations of horns resulting from natural mortality, horns confiscated from poachers, horns taken from rhinos that died during immobilization/transport, etc. For that category of rhino custodians, the TRAFFIC report judges that overall, relatively accurate records have been kept. 

However, for private stockpiles, the situation is significantly different. Despite a ruling by the CITES Conference of Parties in 2007 that the Secretariat should receive by 2009 assurances that ALL rhino horn stockpiles were enumerated and carefully registered, the South African private sector has remained reluctant to divulge such information. One report stated that there were possibly 1,805 kg of horns in private hands in 2009. Using various other means of assessment based on the rate of natural mortality among rhinos held by private individuals, dehorning of breeding females (remember – males are used for trophy hunting and hunters require rhinos with horns), mortality during transport, etc – the TRAFFIC report indicates estimates ranging from 2,837 kg to 4,750 kg of horns in private hands, a difference of up to 263%. Was the reluctance of private owners to divulge the size of their horn stocks in part related to an active underground trade?

At the 2010 CITES Conference of Parties TRAFFIC presented a diplomatically worded statement:

“Whilst the shortfall between reported and expected horn stocks does not confirm that illegal activity is widespread in South Africa’s private sector, it does strongly suggest that significant volumes of rhino horn still remain outside of the legal control system and are vulnerable to undocumented trade in the hands of unscrupulous individuals. That fact, and the failure of five provinces [out of nine in South Africa] to report private horn stocks, indicates that implementation of South Africa’s control policy for rhino horns is inadequate at a time when illicit trade is escalating.”

Until recently, the sale of rhino horns within South Africa to South Africans was allowed. Such legally acquired horns could be exported as personal effects and then sold into the trade via a gaping loophole. In 2009 the South African government imposed a moratorium on national sales that still remains in effect in an attempt to prevent such illegal flows, but there is considerable evidence that many illegal sales from private stockpiles had already taken place. The TRAFFIC report mentions one case in which privately held horns were sold and ended up in Indonesia as well as buyers openly advertising their desire to purchase horns and tusks in the Game and Hunt magazine. It is highly likely that private rhino owners were deeply involved in the illegal trade of horns for many years.

The report also states “Overall, it is now suspected that at least several hundreds of horns have been illegally sold from private rhino horn collections throughout the country, and this trafficking has been augmented by other horns deriving from a series of rhino horn thefts that have grown increasingly frequent …” According to the TRAFFIC report one “wildlife insider” considered that the 2009  government moratorium on underground sales of rhino horns by private owners greatly reduced the flow of horns onto the international market and thus led to the massive increase in poaching since that date. 

Where from here?

South Africa has been credited with a remarkable recovery of white rhino numbers over the past century – up from a small remnant population of 20-50 animals in the Hluhluwe-iMfolozi Game Reserve in 1895 to about 18,000 rhinos now. South Africa was also relatively immune from the poaching scourges that virtually eliminated black rhinos and white rhinos from large parts of eastern and southern Africa beginning in the 1970’s, but has recently been hit with a vengeance. For the eight years 2000-2007, the total number of rhinos poached in South Africa stood at 120, or about 15 per year. But from 2008 to 2012 this number increased to a total of 1,654, or about 331 per year. As of May 15th  this year, already 313 rhinos have been poached. 

This recent poaching crisis has been blamed on a number of factors, including a high level of demand from mainly Vietnam but also China; an exponential increase in the price of rhino horn, possibly reaching a level of $65,000/kg in Asian countries; a considerable rise in wealth among Asian consumers of rhino horn leading to ever-higher demand and prices; the emergence of hardened criminal syndicates dealing with the acquisition and trade of rhino horn; and the ability of such syndicates to engage a network of willing and corrupt partners among private rhino owners and managers, wildlife professionals like veterinarians and pilots, professional hunters, and government officials. In addition, it is becoming ever more apparent that those involved in poaching are highly resilient to a variety of anti-poaching measures and are able to counter such measures with increasingly sophisticated and diverse tactics.     

It is also becoming obvious that plans to target South Africa’s rhinos could have begun well before the great escalation of poaching in 2008. For example, arrests were made as far back as 2004 of Vietnamese nationals attempting to transport rhino horns by air from South Africa into Vietnam, and in 2003 an arrest was made of an individual carrying rhino horns attempting to enter Vietnam from Laos. The first rhino “pseudo-hunts” by Vietnamese nationals began in 2003 with ten rhinos hunted and then took off in 2005. Arrests were subsequently made in Vietnam of individuals carrying a mixture of rhino horns “covered” by hunting permits and those without permits. Interestingly, all seizures of illegal horns in Vietnam ended in 2008, the same year poaching began to take off in South Africa – likely indicative of the progressive ability of the syndicates to ensure safe passage of this illegal wildlife product into Vietnam by means of bribes and influence. 

It should be remembered that before the escalation of poaching began in South Africa, Zimbabwe had been very hard hit. From 1986 to 1993 well over 100 rhinos were poached annually in Zimbabwe compared to only a handful in South Africa. Rhino poaching then declined to very low levels from 1994 to 2001, before growing again in 2002 to present with an increasing shift from Zimbabwe to South Africa (likely because Zimbabwe had fewer and fewer rhinos left to be poached). 

1993 and 1994 were important dates in terms of a decrease in rhino poaching due to two major events. In 1994, a civil war erupted in Yemen, a country previously highly involved in the rhino horn trade, mainly used in the manufacture of dagger handles. After the war, the new Islamic regime frowned on such displays of ostentatious wealth and the bottom dropped out of the dagger handle market. Simultaneously, in 1993 it became illegal to sell rhino horn products on the Traditional Chinese Medicine markets of China and Taiwan, followed in 1994 by Japan, Korea and Vietnam. These changes in Yemen and Asia effectively reduced the demand that had been fuelled by poaching. The slow but increasing resurgence after 2002 is attributed to an exhaustion of stockpiles previously established by Asian marketers, the emergence of considerable wealth among a burgeoning Asian middle class, and the huge price increases in rhino horn that allowed greater risks to be taken by poaching rhinos from previously more “secure” areas (prices rose from $4,700/kg in 1994 to $65,000/kg today). Demand surged, initially met by underground sales from stocks available from South African private rhino owners, but then needing to be augmented by other means as demand kept growing. 

These other means included “pseudo hunts” arranged by horn traffickers and willing South African rhino owners – not only to Vietnamese clients but also proxy hunters from Poland, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Thailand; horn thefts and “pseudo-thefts” (owners claiming horns were stolen to enable illegal sales) from private stockpiles, museums and zoos; and poaching and “pseudo-poaching” (owners shooting their rhinos and claiming they were poached) of private and state-owned rhinos. 

Legalize the trade in horn?

In Vietnam and China, many say that buying ivory and rhino horn and the consequent decimation of animals is not their problem. Rather, they say, the problem lies with the African countries who supply the products to be sold - if these countries want to conserve their wildlife they should not allow it to become marketed, legally or illegally. It would seem South Africa, rather than taking the role of an innocent party suffering from a rhino poaching crisis, should look within for solutions in addition to signing memoranda of understanding with countries like Vietnam. Is it a home-grown problem that facilitated a foreign-grown problem?

Increasingly, there are calls to legalize the rhino horn trade not only by rhino owners with private stockpiles (who would realize a significant windfall profit) but also from members of state institutions, rhino NGOs and the South African government. Beginning with statements made at the recent CITES Conference of Parties in March, South African Environment Minister Edna Molewa seems progressively swayed to consider legalization based on her assessment that nothing that has been done to date seems to be making a difference in stemming the poaching crisis. Such calls might be gaining in popularity but lack rigour in the details of how such a trade would be regulated and controlled. There is no idea about the level of demand, who the trading partners would be and how potential partners like China and Vietnam would change their domestic laws to allow trade in rhino horn. Also, it is uncertain how illegal products would be differentiated from legal horns, a problem that would affect all remaining rhino populations in Africa. In short, such arguments are as yet far from convincing.

Those who claim that providing rhino horns by non-lethal means will control poaching conveniently ignore that such rhino horns have already long been provided from privately-held stocks in the past. As mentioned above, poaching was largely under control from 1994-2001. But the eagerness of those who created a burgeoning demand via supplies from unregistered rhino horn stocks, pseudo-hunts and pseudo-thefts must accept that their actions resulted in a current level of demand that exceeds any means of supply except by renewed poaching. Far from the perceived situation that the trade ban of 1977 limited supply of rhino horn, thereby raising prices and driving poaching, the real situation is that rhino owners in South Africa went around the trade ban by various means to increase a demand that has now exceeded any supply possibilities except by poaching.

South Africa should also realize that the current poaching epidemic has deep roots in misguided policies allowing various forms of commercialization of rhinos under the guise of conservation. These began with sales and auctions to private owners who were quick to cash in on differences between sale prices and hunting prices. Indeed, when considering levels of sales of state-owned rhinos and numbers of rhinos being trophy hunted, it would seem that such sales were merely a conduit to turn a wild rhino into a hunting trophy. State organizations like Ezemvelo (formerly the Natal Parks Board) derive about 75% of their funding from rhino sales and it is not surprising that intensive management is applied to wild rhino populations to stimulate reproduction and boost the possibility of future income. Such practices, coupled with a strong reluctance on the part of private rhino owners to divulge information about the numbers of rhinos in their hands, undermine any claims that this benefits rhino conservation. 

With the combination of lax enforcement of laws against domestic sales of rhino horns and products in China and Vietnam, increased wealth allowing more purchases of rhino horn products for whatever reasons, and a ready supply of pseudo-legal and illegal horns by traffickers aided and abetted by South African private rhino owners, it is highly questionable if any level of legal supply will now stem poaching. 

Conclusion 

The TRAFFIC report mentioned that “… a unique set of circumstances and a new criminal coalescence of players lies behind the carnage … A potent mix of unscrupulous wildlife professionals, some corrupt government officials and hardened Asian criminal syndicates has converged to create the “perfect storm” for wreaking havoc on the country’s rhino populations.”

I agree that while there might be a “perfect storm” now, it is clear with hindsight that the factors that caused this storm have existed for quite some time but went un-noticed or were ignored. South Africa has grabbed a tiger by the tail and must find ways to let go without sacrificing more rhinos in the future, turning more rhinos into commodities by placing them in irresponsible private hands, and,  actually, dealing with the consequences of bad decisions and complacency in the past. 

Picture credit: www.africanrhino.org/2012/09/01/farming-rhinos-the future

                                                                            Looking to you

A few days ago Chris Mercer of the Campaign against Canned Hunting re-visited a ruling by the South African Supreme Court of Appeals (SCA) that gave the go-ahead for lion breeders to conduct business as usual. The South African Predator Breeder’s Association (SAPBA) appealed because they had lost a case in the High Court against the then Minister of Environment Marthinus van Schalkwyk – who tried to impose a 24-month re-wilding rule on any lion destined for a trophy hunt. 

Chris Mercer correctly points out that the SCA, of their own volition (ex mero motu in legalese), made a decision that since captive lion breeding (and thereby their trophy hunting) was a “closed system” that had nothing to do with conservation, the Minister of Environment had no jurisdiction. Lions in captivity were like farm animals, and therefore they did not need to be “re-wilded” as they were never wild in the first place. 

So the lion breeding and canned hunting could go ahead according to the South African court. 

However, it is surprising that nobody in South Africa with legal standing has taken up the many issues of canned lion hunting that are begging to be challenged. Just because the Minister of Environment was judged not to have jurisdiction, it does not mean, ipso facto, that nobody else can challenge the canned hunting business on a diversity of issues.

Revisiting the original ruling by the High Court that upheld the 24-month re-wildling order by the Minister, a number of very interesting comments were made by the Judge (J. van der Merwe) in his summation.

 These included:

"•Although in all provinces permits are required for hunting of lions, there are material differences between the provisions and measures applicable in the provinces. In Mpumalanga, for instance, it is a requirement that the size of the area in which a lion may be hunted must be no less than 1000 hectares. Such provision is also applied in the North West province. In Gauteng this minimum area is 400 hectares, but that may be deviated from by permit. In the Free State only a minimum of 100 hectares is required. The rest of the provinces have no legislation in respect of minimum size of areas in which the hunt may take place. Only the Free State and North West provinces, where by far the greater portion of the industry is situated and operated, have self-sustaining provisions. In the Free State it is required that a lion must be free ranging for a period of three months before it may be hunted, whereas in the North West province this period is only 96 hours. It is clear therefore that there is no uniformity in this regard and that in some provinces it would be possible to hunt a lion bred in captivity virtually immediately after it had been released into whatever area is allowed by the permit.

•It is undisputed that the term “canned hunting” was coined by the international media to express disdain of the practice of hunting of lions that were bred and raised in captivity and are therefore dependent on humans for their livelihood and survival, shortly after they had been “released”, often in small enclosures.

•On 6 April 2005, in his budget speech in Parliament, the respondent [the Minister] however announced that he has appointed a panel of experts (“the panel”) to advise and report on both hunting in buffer zones and canned hunting of large predators. Individuals were appointed on the panel on the basis of their expertise in a range of areas that affect the hunting industry, including wildlife management, community involvement, transformation, biodiversity conservation and sustainable use.

•On 11 and 12 August 2005 the panel held public hearings …  The essence of [some of] these representations was that the hunting of captive bred lions should be allowed shortly after a lion has been released in an enclosure of at least 2 000 hectares. The main aspects put forward as justification for this stance were the earning of foreign revenue by the industry, the creation of job opportunities by it as well as the idea that captive breeding and hunting of lions is a conservation tool that relieves pressure on the selective hunting of wild lions.

•It was also said that the panel has been guided in its assessment of each issue placed before it by three broad sets of principles. The first set of principles relates to the sustainable use of wildlife, which seeks to ensure that any practices associated with hunting do not compromise the long-term survival and viability of a particular species or ecosystem. The second principle relates to the humane treatment of animals, as set out in the Animal Protection Act, and whether the outcome of any practice that affects a wild animal, planned or not, is considered an offence in terms of the Animal Protection Act. The third principle relates to ethical hunting and in particular the principle of fair chase which is the foundation of the professional hunting industry.

•The panel stated … economic considerations may never be used to condone or ignore practices that either compromise the country’s biodiversity, undermine the humane treatment of hunted animals, or that may taint the reputation of the hunting industry in the long run.

•The panel found that there is little evidence to demonstrate that much of the breeding of wildlife in intensive wildlife systems is motivated by conservation objectives. The panel …  found however that hunting could not contribute to biodiversity conservation objectives in an intensive wildlife production context and that that furthermore also compromises the principle of fair chase which is fundamental to any ethical, professional and recreational hunting industry.

•Regarding hunting practices the panel found that the practices of “put and take” hunting and canned hunting are unethical practices that both the relevant industry associations and the animal welfare groups are concerned about. The panel found that both practices are in contravention of the principles of humane treatment of animals and fair chase. “Put and take” was also found to be a threat to diversity conservation due to the risks posed when a wild animal from an intensive wildlife production unit is introduced to an extensive wildlife production unit. On these grounds the panel recommended that both these practices be prohibited and that mechanisms to enforce these prohibitions be identified.

•The Panel recognises the role of captive breeding as a method to support the rehabilitation of species for conservation purposes, especially if free-roaming animals have to be captured or rehabilitated for whatever reason. However, captive breeding for the sole purpose of hunting has led to the abuse of the primary intention of captive breeding since the original intention was to conserve species rather than to hunt.

•The principle of fair chase is not compatible with the hunting of captive bred animals unless they have become self-sustaining on extensive wildlife production units. In general, the practice of hunting captive bred animals should be disallowed. 

•It is not disputed that the hunting of lions bred in captivity has damaged the reputation of the Republic of South Africa immensely. It is clear on the evidence and also not disputed that very many people all over the world find the notion of hunting a lion bred and raised in captivity, often by hand, and totally dependent on humans for its survival, abhorrent and repulsive. I find this view to be objectively reasonable and justifiable, to say the least. This is so even, or perhaps especially so, if the hunting of such animal takes place in the circumstances put forward on behalf of the applicants [the canned hunting breeders and operators] as the most humane, namely the following: 

“Working back from the actual date (day 0) of the hunt, the following time line is suggested:

* day -7: feed the lion a big meal (lions are ‘feast-and-famine’ eaters – after gorging themselves on a really big meal, they can go without a next meal for several days).

* day -5 or -4: the lion is darted and the immobilized animal put in a crate, transported to the property where it will be hunted and released. Make sure that several adequate water points are available for the lion.

* day 0: the lion is hunted (four or five days after being released and running free. It means that there is no further contact by the lion with humans since it does not require to be fed. The lion may be lucky during this time and catch something on its own to eat).”

Justice van der Merwe also dismissed the notion that imposing a 24-month re-wilding rule would cause financial ruin for the canned lion hunting breeders and operators, and ruled against the applicants in the original court case. 

To sum up, and despite the ruling on appeal that the Minister of Environment had no jurisdiction, the following main points were made during the original High Court ruling:

•Captive breeding for the sole purpose of hunting has led to the abuse of the primary intention of captive breeding;

•Economic considerations may never be used to condone or ignore practices that undermine the humane treatment of hunted animals;

•The practices of “put and take” hunting and canned hunting are unethical  and are in contravention of the principles of humane treatment of animals and fair chase;

•In general, the practice of hunting captive bred animals should be disallowed;

•The hunting of lions bred in captivity has damaged the reputation of the Republic of South Africa immensely. 

It would seem to me that these are sufficient grounds to challenge in court the practice of canned lion hunting again. The fact that nobody in South Africa has taken this up this challenge is puzzling – instead, canned lion breeding and hunting has become a growth industry as I mentioned in a previous blog and there could now be as many as 8,000 lions in cages feeding the industry. 

There are a variety of means by which this malicious business can be stopped, and we will work on those aspects like the international trade where we can make a difference. In the mean time we would hope that groups in South Africa would take up the challenge of taking the lion hunters and breeders to court based on the fact that the practice is unethical and by definition based on animal cruelty. 

                                                            Can’t stand being a commodity

The more I read about the recent defeat of the joint USA/Russian Federation proposal to uplist Polar Bears to CITES Appendix I (highly restricted international trade), the more convinced I become that this decision was politically motivated, was not based on any economic or cultural benefit to the native Inuit communities, was shamefully handled by the EU delegations especially Denmark, and was a blot on Canada that perhaps peddled influence over Arctic resources in return for votes. 

 My English teachers would be very critical of my use of the over-long sentence above. I beg extenuating circumstances that make me hot under the collar. And in order to consider the issue fully, I hope that you will extend the 2-minute attention span I am assured applies to all blog readers to about five or six minutes. 

 Let’s objectively consider some of the arguments used to defeat this proposal (a 2/3 majority was needed – 38 voted for uplisting, 42 against, and 48 abstained, including 26 EU member states as Denmark voted against – many of those who voted against used the argument that it would go against the cultural rights of the Inuits). A weak compromise proposal by the EU delegations was not accepted by the USA and the Russian Federation and was also defeated.

 The Inuit representatives at the CITES meeting lobbied that it was their cultural right to hunt polar bears as they had done so for centuries, and that the proceeds from such hunting was necessary to augment their meagre incomes associated with living in a part of the world where little alternative revenue is available. 

That argument needs to be looked at in some detail – actually it is two arguments. The first is that the Inuit have hunted polar bears for centuries and is part of their culture. That is true, and the polar bear plays an important part in an Inuit culture of hunting. However, such hunting used to come coupled with cultural ethics. For example, the Inuit believe that

“The greatest peril of life lies in the fact that human food consists entirely of souls. All the creatures that we have to kill and eat, all those that we have to strike down and destroy to make clothes for ourselves, have souls, like we have, souls that do not perish with the body, and which must therefore be propitiated lest they should avenge themselves on us for taking away their bodies.”

 Also,

“Because of these beliefs, the Inuit had a complicated set of hunting taboos that they needed to observe to be respectful of the animals that, by necessity, they needed to hunt … and to ensure that future hunting would be successful. Various gestures of respect and kindness to the souls of animals were considered to be encouragements to the animal to reincarnate into another body and, out of gratitude, allow itself to be killed again by the same hunter.”

Polar bears were special –

“The polar bear spirit was considered to be the most powerful, dangerous, and potentially revengeful … Bear hunts were usually accidental. If, while out seal hunting, fresh bear tracks are found, the hunter would set out with his dogs on the leash, armed only with his sealing harpoon. The chase was a strenuous one that could go on for days. When finally the hunter caught up with the bear, and the dogs had rounded it up, the fight was with the harpoon alone.”

Once the polar bear was killed, a number of rituals had to be observed –

“The Inuit believed that when a bear had been killed, its soul remained at the point of the harpoon head for four days if it was a male bear, and five days if it was a female bear. The soul of the bear was very dangerous during the days that it stayed in the weapon that killed it, and if it was offended, might become one of those evil spirits that persecutes people with illness or other distress. This time period was considered to be sufficient time for the bear’s soul to return to its family.

The hunter who has killed a bear and returns to his house must take off all of his outer clothing, including his outer mittens and kamiks, before entering the house. For a whole month, he must not eat of the meat or blubber of the bear. Since bears are always thirsty, it was thought to have a positive effect on their souls to give them drinking water once they have been brought into the house. (There is a prescribed way of doing this too.) 

Other death rituals (observed for four or five days, depending on the sex of the animal) surrounding the polar bear include taking the skin, with the skull intact, and hanging it, hair side out, by the nostrils in the snow hut. 

Inside, the skin, the bear’s bladder, spleen, tongue, and genitals are hung together with presents that are being made to the soul of the bear. For a male bear, various men’s implements such as knives, tools, harpoon heads, etc. must be hung up near the skin. If the bear was female, similar women’s implements (cooking utensils, an ulu, etc.) are hung up. The bear is given human tools because it was believed that bears could sometimes change themselves into humans. These gifts are similar to the possessions left with the dead because it was believed that like humans, male bears need their hunting weapons, and female bears need their domestic tools.

As long as the death taboo for the soul of the bear is being observed no man’s or woman’s work may be done, including gathering fuel or sewing new clothing (only the most necessary of repairs to clothing is allowed.) As soon as the taboo is over, children must throw the gifts to the bear’s soul on the floor and afterwards compete in picking them up again. The one who can collect the gifts most quickly will be a skilled bear hunter. 

It was thought that the spirits of humans and polar bears were interchangeable... possibly because bears have many “human” traits. They can stand up and walk on their hind legs. It walks on the soles of its feet the way humans do (unlike most other animals), and leaves full footprints when it walks. It can use its forepaws like hands to carry food to its mouth. It can sit and lean against something as if it is resting and thinking. 

The polar bear eats many of the same foods that humans do. The Inuit respect the bears’ hunting skills, and some stories state that their ancestors learned how to hunt seals by watching polar bears. They respect the bears’ strength, patience, inquisitiveness, speed, and the maternal devotion to their cubs. The Inuit also respect the intelligence of polar bears. Some Inuit believe that polar bears have an intelligence matching or exceeding that of humans.

The fact that may garner the most respect is that a skinned bear carcass has an eerie similarity to the human carcass. Many Inuit stories have polar bears that become humans by removing their fur coats, and then become bears again by putting their coats back on, or are human in their houses, but bears outside of them.”

I have quoted the above at length from an insightful article written here as I believe it is important to understand the actual role polar bears played in Inuit culture. All of that has pretty much gone out the window, and polar bears are now hunted as a commodity. So where stands the argument that polar bears should be commercially hunted as part of Inuit culture and therefore an “inalienable” right? It is in fact cultural anathema to hunt bears for skins and trophies.

This is what Terry Audla, president of the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and present to lobby at the CITES convention had to say about polar bear hunting  :  

"It is very important, it is our livelihood. 

This is how we make our living; this is how we put food on the table. And for the rest of the world to suggest that how we manage the polar bear is not right is a slap in the face - but the decision that was made today shows we are doing the right thing.

What's traded is not in any way detrimental to the polar bear population. We harvest for subsistence, we are never driven by the market."

But is it really so important to local economies? Let’s look at three pertinent lines of evidence, a very detailed report written by George Wenzel, a survey done by the provincial government of Nunavut in Canada, and a comprehensive report written by the Humane Society International and the International Foundation for Animal Welfare. 

Before we go there, let’s be clear about something. If the CITES delegates had voted for an uplisting of polar bears to CITES Appendix I, this would in no way have interfered with ANY rights of indigenous people to maintain their “cultural” rights to hunt polar bears. CITES only controls (poorly) international trade in endangered species based the impact that such trade will have on conservation status. The USA and Russian Federation proposal to uplist the bears was only based on commercial trade, not cultural rights. 

So how did the commercial trade evolve among the Inuit? Trade involves polar bear pelts and hunting trophies. Commercial sport hunting of polar bears has an interesting history. According to George Wenzel, the first sport hunt occurred in 1969, when an Army officer decided to shoot a bear near to where he was stationed. During the ten years 1970-1979 sport hunting accounted for 0.8% of the quota of 440 bears assigned to Inuits by the Canadian government. By 1990-2000, this had risen to 14.7%. Why? In 1983, the international market for Canadian seal skins collapsed, in part due to an import ban imposed by the European Union. At about the same time, narwhal hunting was placed on a moratorium. To make recompense, the Northwest Territories provincial government, through their Department of Economic Development and Tourism decided to promote polar bear sport hunting. The Department provided not only start-up funding for sport hunt development but facilitated contacts with “big game” hunting wholesalers.  

The Canadian government had insisted, as part of their agreement in 1981 to join the International Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, that they had the right to assign part of the annual polar bear quota for-profit to sport hunters via the Inuit communities. Hunting by local people was allowed by using traditional methods. Are bears therefore hunted with harpoons and dog sleds by the Inuit? Not on your life – these days it is with high powered rifles and snowmobiles. Sport hunters in contrast are given a more “cultural” experience and often get dragged around on sleds. Not that it handicaps them – in four polar bear population areas the success rate was 94% as reported by George Wenzel. 

So how commercially important to the Inuit is polar bear hunting? Is it really, as claimed by Mr Audla, an important part of their livelihood? The HSI/IFAW report has this to say:

“The economic benefits of polar bear hunting were, even at their peak, far too limited and far too concentrated in far too few hands to amount to anything approximating a solution to the broader socio-economic troubles faced by the Inuit…”

IFAW and HSI also said that barely half of the proceeds from bear sport hunting end up with the Inuit communities. And that out of 28 Inuit communities surveyed, polar bear sport hunting amounted to an average of 0.8% of the annual income of those communities. IFAW and HSI concluded that instead of any economic difference to Inuit communities via sport hunting, only several dozen individuals at most profited from commercial utilization of the bears. Also, many Inuit communities themselves rejected commercial hunting of polar bears – the very issue presented to CITES.

It would seem that provincial government surveys among the Inuit agree. Among Inuit “harvesters”, 44% indicated that issues like housing, education and employment were most important to their future. Only 6% of those Inuit people with an arguably vested interest in continuing polar bear hunting put that activity at the top of their list of overall priorities. What this says to me is that the Canadian federal government has got their support for international trade in polar bears badly wrong and should instead build schools, houses and clinics. They should certainly not have invested money in promoting polar bear trophy hunting as a means of employment…   

So where did it all go wrong at CITES? Well, there are many scenarios, so I’ll just add mine. 

•I believe delegations were wrongly swayed into opposition to uplist polar bears by Greenpeace, WWF and the CITES Secretariat who all made their negative opinions well known before the vote. 

•I believe delegations bought into the cultural rights argument of the Inuits to hunt polar bears and did not comprehend that this was not threatened by a cessation of commercial utilization. 

•I believe CITES Parties’ arms were twisted by Canada to consider a negative vote in return for rights to Arctic mineral and oil resources. It is interesting that such resources have become increasingly more commercially exploitable by one of the same factors threatening polar bears – global warming that is causing significant reductions in Arctic ice cover.

•I believe that the issue of commercial utilization of the bears was completely misunderstood in terms of it making any contribution to the financial wellbeing of Inuit communities. 

In short, the decision not to give declining polar bear populations additional protection from a cessation of international trade in bear products was a typical CITES snafu. There is some optimism though; this report points out that support for the continued use of polar bears as trade commodities is losing support among former proponents. Let’s hope that the issue is treated with more rational thinking at the next CITES Conference of Parties?

Picture credit: http://nicoleandtim.blogspot.co.uk/2009_07_01_archive.html

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                                                        Big trophy, good price, no sweat

The good news is that trophy hunting numbers (when comparing the last five year period 2002-2006 to the most recent five year period 2007-2011) have decreased for wild lions in Tanzania and Zimbabwe. The bad news is that “trophy” hunting of captive bred lions (“canned hunting”) in South Africa is on the increase. Here we explore some of the possible reasons for these trends.

The decrease in wild lion hunting

 Overall, hunting of wild lions in Tanzania and Zimbabwe has dropped by an average of 45% over the past five years (Table 1). In their heyday Tanzania exported an average of 261 wild lions per year (1994-2003) and Zimbabwe an average of 139 wild lions per year (1990-1999). These two countries are still by far the biggest exporters of wild lion trophies, but there seems to be a waning interest among lion trophy hunters from the five major importing countries (Table 2).

 This drop can be explained as follows:

a) Cost. Hunting wild lions is expensive, and given a cheaper option in South Africa with “canned hunts”, cost-conscious hunters looking for bargains might be avoiding safaris that can set them back $100,000 to settle for a trophy that will cost far less than half that.

b) Availability. Both Tanzania and Zimbabwe have allowed shooting of lions at an unsustainable rate in past years, with the result that fewer and fewer lions occur in hunting concessions. In Tanzania, hunters were consequently shooting lions as young as two years old, a practice that is now no longer “allowed” by the Government though enforcement is another matter. In Zimbabwe, hunters lure lions out of protected areas to be shot, and shoot lions within protected areas with complicity and corruption of the wildlife authorities. Allegedly, some hunting concessions in Zimbabwe are now so depopulated of trophy lions that they are importing captive bred lions from South Africa to be shot.

c) Success rate. Clients must pay for their safaris (but not the trophy fees) whether or not they manage to shoot a lion. Some hunters, a small minority, are willing to spend money on successive trips to finally shoot “their” lion, but the word does get out among the hunting community when increasing numbers of would-be lion hunters keep returning empty-handed.

The increase in hunting of captive bred lions in South Africa can be explained as follows:

 a) Cost. As mentioned above, it is far cheaper to shoot a lion in South Africa than anywhere else as these are “put and take” hunts – the lion is supplied by a breeder, put in a fenced enclosure, and taken by the hunter. Female lions can be shot for about $4,000 - $5,000, and males start from about $15,000 (depending on the “quality” of the trophy – shooting an inbred white lion can cost $30,000).

b) Availability. There is no problem with availability, as each hunter is pre-assigned a lion before they arrive. The level of availability is only determined by the rate at which breeders can supply trophy quality lions from a captive population estimated at about 5,000 animals. Some operators even provide pictures and prices of the lions available to prospective clients.

c) Success rate. Any “canned” lion hunter is guaranteed success, as every lion available to be bought is assigned to a particular client. There is no hunting season. The hunting operators generally “demand” a seven to ten-day safari, and the “hunter” might not be provided with the lion to shoot until some days have passed. The first few days are spent “searching” for the lion by the gullible client on the larger game ranches, but when the lion is set out in the right area, the client is taken straight there. Lions might have only been transported the evening before, and are generally provided with a bait to keep them fixed in a particular spot. As these are lions very used to humans, clients can generally walk right up to their target to take an “easy” shot.

d) A variety of weapons and tactics. “Canned” lion hunters can shoot lions from their car or only have to walk a short distance to bag their trophy. “Canned” lions can be shot by rifle, bow, black powder rifle, crossbow or handgun. “Canned” lions can be shot in small enclosures or on fenced ranches.

Consequences

 Lion trophy hunting is touted by proponents as being a conservation measure – if lion hunting is stopped, large swathes of trophy hunting concessions in Tanzania, for example, will no longer be commercially viable. This will mean, according to the hunting operators, that all such hunting concessions will inevitably become havens for poachers and cattle. The newly appointed Director of Wildlife in Tanzania was motivated to write an Op-Ed article for the New York Times (Saving Lions by Killing Them), specifically quoting the need by Tanzania for income from lion trophy hunting. Sadly he got all his numbers wrong. He states that “an average of 200 lions are shot each year, generating about $1,960,000 in revenue”, likely salivating at the prospect. Actually, we can see that not only has lion hunting decreased by 44% over the past five years, but in 2011 a provisional total of only 57 lions were shot for an income to Government (trophy fees) of $456,000.

Is it worth continuing lion hunting in Tanzania for the sake of 57 hunters going home with their trophies balanced against an uncertain future of the species exacerbated by excessive hunting offtake in the past? What is the future of lion hunting in Tanzania now that bargain basement hunting is available in South Africa?

Also, what does this say about all the “hunter-conservationists” we read so much about? They supposedly shoot lions to benefit the species by spending lots of money to employ people and benefit communities, build schools and clinics, and put funds in Government coffers to be used for wildlife protection. But if they are defecting at a great rate from such high moral stances to shoot captive raised lions in South Africa, how serious about conservation were they in the first place? It is beginning to look like all they cared about was a lion trophy by any means or standards - underage, lured from a protected area, or captive-raised?  

Picture credit:  http://bit.ly/YOsDBO

Table 1: Total number of lions hunted in the three top lion trophy export countries during the five year periods 2002-2006 and 2007 to 2011. Changes between the most recent and the previous five year periods are shown in the last column.

Table 2: Change in export numbers from Tanzania, Zimbabwe and South Africa from the five year period 2002-2006 to the most recent five year period 2007-2011 to the listed importing countries.

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                                                                            We’re back…

We are all aware of the ever-increasing levels of rhino poaching in South Africa, but the reasons might be much more complicated than we think – we might have to make connections with diamond mining in Zimbabwe and the former Mozambican rebel group RENAMO. This was revealed in a thought-provoking article by Brian Sandberg  on which I enlarge here.

As of yesterday, this year’s toll on South African rhinos stands at 227, and at current rates of 2.25 rhinos poached per day, the 2013 total could reach 820. This total compares with 668 last year, 448 in 2011 and 333 in 2010. What is also interesting is that Kruger National Park, home to an estimated rhino population of 5,847 to 12,714 animals depending on various estimates and extrapolations, is increasingly being targeted. In 2010, 44% of the total rhinos poached were in Kruger, growing to 56% in 2011, 64% in 2012, and 72% this year. This is despite “all efforts” by South Africa, including recruitment of more rangers, involvement of the SA Army, better equipment, helicopters, more patrols, etc. Recent reports say that poaching is mainly conducted by Mozambicans who are supposedly highly trained, well-armed, and well-versed in military tactics. They appear to be running circles around any defensive forces South Africa can throw at them.

I have my doubts about the will of South Africa to deal effectively with such poaching, especially as there are strict rules placed on rangers and Army personnel that limit effective engagement – the poachers must be physically arrested and cannot be fired upon unless they shoot first. Also, Environment Minister Edna Molewa has already said that everything the South African authorities are doing is not working and the only solution will be the legalization of rhino horn trade to “undermine” the poachers. I have written before about why this will not work, but nevertheless Molewa seems completely under the thrall of the private rhino owners who stand to make many millions by selling their stockpiles. Weak attempts have been made to sign Memoranda of Understanding with Vietnam to cooperate in reducing the illegal trade, and Mozambique to halt the illegal trafficking. Nobody in their right mind, except perhaps the CITES Secretariat, thinks these “agreements” will achieve much.

Brian Sandberg, in an interview with a well-informed Mozambican, pointed to some other reasons why rhino horn trafficking is currently a growth industry in Mozambique. His informer said it had to do with diamonds in Zimbabwe and the resurgence of RENAMO – the Mozambican National Resistance Movement.

Let’s begin with the diamonds. These occur in the Marange fields in Zimbabwe, just across the border from Mozambique. The diamond fields are operated through the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation. Four companies operate in the area – Marange Resources (100% owned by ZMDC) and the  others which are all 50% owned by ZMDC - Diamond Mining Corporation, Mbada Diamonds and Anjin Investments. Anjin Investments is a joint venture mining and processing company with the Chinese Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Company. Interestingly, the Zimbabwe Treasury receives little benefit from these diamonds – for example Anjin Investments contributed no funds at all, and the others contributed amounts far below their earnings – much of which is allegedly flowing into the private accounts of Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party officials. ZMDC is on the UK Government Sanction list because of close connections with Mugabe’s party.

There has always been a black market for diamonds in Zimbabwe and Mozambique and an active smuggling network allegedly involving Israel and Russia. It is not unreasonable to assume that RENAMO has been profiting from such smuggling and deriving needed funds to fuel their increasingly separatist and belligerent attitude towards the Mozambican government.

RENAMO was formed in 1976 with Rhodesian financial assistance to battle against Mugabe’s ZANU operating against the Rhodesian government from bases within Mozambique. When Mugabe came to power in independent Zimbabwe in 1980, RENAMO funding was taken over by the Apartheid government in South Africa to destabilize Mozambique and fight against elements of the ANC established in Mozambique. A peace accord was signed between FRELIMO (the current ruling party) and RENAMO in 1992, ending the Mozambique civil war. In the 1994 election RENAMO won over 47% of the vote and 112 seats in Parliament, but support has been eroding ever since. RENAMO now has 50 seats (of 250) and is not pleased.

RENAMO leader Afonso Dhlakama has now threatened a return to conflict, wants to renegotiate the peace agreement with FRELIMO, and is refusing to participate in local elections. Violence is escalating with police officers being shot and guerrilla fighters being retrained. Dhlakama has moved his headquarters to the Gorongosa region, close to the diamond mines in Zimbabwe. This has caused concern in Zimbabwe as it is felt that RENAMO and crime syndicates could be aiming to destabilize the diamond area. See also  further articles here and here.

Given RENAMO’s posturing, such new-found confidence could well have been due to an injection of funding for arms and operations from rhino horns. Destabilization of southern Mozambique and the Zimbabwe diamond areas could well benefit South Africa’s alleged wishes to keep neighbours weak and their economies disorganized to maintain regional dominance of South Africa’s economy. Is it possible that South Africa is using former ally RENAMO to achieve such aims? Is that why rhinos are being poached in Kruger with such seeming impunity? Does it explain the seeming lack of will to adequately prosecute poachers arrested in Kruger and the seeming reluctance of South Africa to request and apply the concept of “hot pursuit” to capture poachers once they cross the Mozambique border? 

Rhino conservation efforts look increasingly bleak with this toxic stew of contributing factors. As former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pointed out last year, poaching benefits organized crime networks, terrorist organizations and local militias, and compromises national security. It would seem of benefit to Mozambique to shut down destabilizing sectors operating within her borders by eliminating their income streams including the illegal trafficking in highly lucrative rhino horns. Meanwhile all trade and possession of rhino horns must become illegal and strongly prosecuted in destination countries like Vietnam and China and all legal loopholes facilitating the trade in rhino horns (hunting trophies) must cease. Only if rhino horns are commercially worthless will the poaching stop.

Picture credit: http://www.malawivoice.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/renamo-.jpg

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                                                     It has been going on for a while.....

Few people realize that it is perfectly legal to buy ivory carvings in a number of countries – like South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, China, Thailand and Japan. The problem is, once you have bought it, you cannot export it. Well, except if you buy it in Zimbabwe or Namibia, where you can buy ivory carvings “for non-commercial purposes” (whatever that means, it probably makes sense to CITES?). Ivory carvings are also described as “worked ivory”, but there is no clear definition of what “worked” means – it could, for example, mean that it was “worked” into a chopstick, a simple bracelet, or even a bit of ivory with some “artistic” scratches on it.

After the Conference of Parties in Doha (2010) where such non-commercial trade in ivory carvings was authorised, CITES made a small change in the regulations. Before, Zimbabwe’s licenced domestic dealers were issuing “Short Export Permits” supplied as blank forms by the Zimbabwe CITES Management Authority, and only needed to be filled in and then endorsed by a Customs officer to permit the buyer to take ivory home. Acknowledging that that practice was a bit out of the ordinary, CITES decided to do away with permits issued by dealers and told customers to get a “real” export permit from one of the three Management Authority offices in Zimbabwe before being allowed to export their carvings. Not a big change really, and one probably ignored. In a corrupt country like Zimbabwe, CITES permits for practically anything can probably be bought with ease.

Zimbabwe is desperate to sell the ivory they have stockpiled. They were allowed to do so by CITES in 1999 when Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia were given permission to sell a total of 49 tons to Japan, and again in 2008 when Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa sold a total of 101 tons to China and Japan. However, the Zimbabwe National Parks & Wildlife Management Authority now seems to be $10 million in arrears and would like to sell the current stockpile for $8 million or so. Proceeds would go to antipoaching, enforcement, and Quelea control (Queleas are small seed-eating birds that join in huge flocks and can devastate crops). There was no proposal to CITES in 2013, but the Minister is eager to have one on the table in 2016.

Meanwhile, CITES trade records show that Zimbabwe has been doing quite well in ivory sales, thank you very much. CITES trade records only go up to 2011, and can only be considered partial for that year. Nevertheless, in 2010 and 2011 alone, Zimbabwe exported 101,651 grams of ivory carvings (83,256 grams to China and 12,670 grams to Slovakia as the major consumers); 3,141 kilos of ivory carvings (3,080 kilos to China); and 2,927 individual carvings (2,547 to China). That’s a lot of carvings in two years, all for non-commercial purposes of course, and doubtless all bought by hordes of Chinese tourists travelling to Zimbabwe.

Also, and this is where things get a bit shady as CITES only allows trade in “carvings”, Zimbabwe exported 1,207 kilos of ivory “pieces” to Japan in 2009; 10,910 kilos of tusks from 2009-2011 (2,798 kilos to China and surprisingly, 4,156 kilos to USA as major destinations; others include Germany, Spain, UK, Italy, Poland, Russia and Slovakia); and 515 individual tusks from 2009-2011 (128 to South Africa and 75 to China as major destinations; others include Germany, Spain, Ireland and Romania). All duly issued with export permits by the Zimbabwe CITES Management Authority and all duly registered in the CITES trade database. But what about the legality of those sales? These are not hunting trophies but an entirely different category of exports.

These ivory exports seemed to raise no eyebrows at the CITES Secretariat.

The way CITES operates is that member states (the Parties) are “requested” to abide by the rules set by the Secretariat and the Conferences of Parties, and that no Party trades with another in wildlife products that are not approved. CITES permits are however issued locally, and can create a shambles for CITES rules and regulations until such “irregularities” are detected and the Secretariat issues a warning. Being a rather secretive organization (maintained with our taxes) we are not allowed to know what Parties have been issued warnings and whether these were heeded.

Meanwhile Zimbabwe continues to trade in tons of ivory, seemingly ignoring the fact they are not allowed to sell any under current rules. In 2008 CITES allowed Zimbabwe to sell 3,700 kg of ivory legally. Since then and up to 2011, Zimbabwe has exported on the order of 19,842 kilos of ivory that are not “carvings”. To me, at current minimal prices of about $500 per kilo, it seems that would supply lots of funds to battle those pesky Queleas?

Picture credit: US Library of Congress: cph.3c02973

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                                                  Ivory should only be worn by elephants

A blog by Anthony Stevenson Wanguru Ruoro

From time to time LionAid invites guest bloggers to post their opinions on current issues. Anthony Rouro is a Kenyan currently living in Sweden.

Introduction

Is there any hope for the fate of the African elephant ?

It may be time after 40 years of CITES for a new organization to be born out of what was ideally a great idea for an international body to oversee trade in wildlife fauna and fora. It is perhaps time to create a new one that has conservation as its primary goal and not trade. An organization that will by consensus and approval include the local indigenous people in the decisions they make involving the species they live with daily.

We humans are this planet's worst enemies. Our superiority leaves us with the thought we can do anything to Mother Earth and there will be no consequences whatsoever. Well we are wrong and its time we need to reflect and re-think what we are doing to ensure that many species remain alive and well.

Its my hope that CITES and many other organizations will start to realize that money cannot replace any species on this planet. Trade and game trophy and canned hunting are not what comprise a sustainable conservation effort. Those are selfish hobbies that spill blood in the name of pleasure and profit. We have to ensure all vital species are well cared for and protected. If nations will be forced into the trade and game trophy hunting domains by an organization that has this as its ultimate goal, then it may be time for countries and NGO´s to consider leaving CITES. 

Change to ensure the African elephant is protected from global demand of its ivory has to start today. It is only the elephant that should wear ivory. To care does not cost anything but to repair the damage caused by not caring that is a waste of resources that could have been used better elsewhere. We do not have to become a world that does not care.

With this I leave you with the following quotes by the late Dr. Wangari Mathaai, Kenyan Nobel Peace Prize laureate:

”The environment and the economy are really both two sides of the same coin. You cannot sustain the economy if you don’t take care of the environment”.

“We’re constantly being bombarded by problems that we face and sometimes we can get completely overwhelmed. [But] we should always feel like a hummingbird. I may feel insignificant, but I don’t want to be like the other animals watching the planet go down the drain. I’ll be a hummingbird, I’ll do the best I can.”

Anthony Stevenson Wanguru Ruoro

Picture credit: Wikimedia Commons

                                                                        Am I now saved?

In a previous blog, I stated that Alexander Songorwa’s Opinion Piece in the New York Times to attempt to convince the USFWS to NOT place lions on the US Endangered Species Act was flawed on many counts. Not least because of Songorwa’s attempts to convince that there are 16,800 lions in Tanzania and that hunting is highly regulated. Songorwa is the latest Director of Wildlife in Tanzania.

I also mentioned that the hopeless state of Tanzania’s wildlife estimates, and the high level of corruption in the Wildlife Department and among the hunting associations, should urge great caution in accepting Songorwa’s statements.

Marc Bellemare, an Assistant Professor of public policy and economics at Duke University, published independently an article in the USA Star Tribune newspaper pointing out that corruption keeps Tanzania from being a good steward of its wildlife.

Marc said “Songorwa argues that American lion hunters generate 60 percent of Tanzania’s millions of dollars in revenues from trophy hunting, and that lion hunting is well-regulated in Tanzania. I am sceptical — especially in light of the fact that Tanzania is more corrupt than the median of 176 countries surveyed by Transparency International for its 2012 Corruption Perception Index, which says Tanzania’s levels of corruption are comparable to those of Argentina and Gabon”.

He added “Not only is Tanzania a relatively corrupt country, but researchers also note extensive corruption in the hunting sector. It is for that reason that Tanzania’s minister for Natural Resources and Tourism issued a stern warning to the Tanzania Safari Outfitters Association at a meeting in Dar-es-Salaam last fall, noting that corruption usually began with wealthy hunters bribing officials so that they would turn a blind eye to illegal behaviour”.

Marc concluded “Instead of lobbying against placing the African lion on the endangered species list, Tanzania should seek to reform its institutions. Not only would this help protect the country’s big-game reserves, it is also a crucial step toward the sustainable development of the Tanzanian economy. A persistent finding in development economics is that dysfunctional institutions, of which corruption is a symptom, are an important cause of underdevelopment”.

In a subsequent communication to me Marc said “It just seemed somewhat obvious to me that Tanzania should fix its institutions (a concept which has been known to development economists for a while, but which is now very much in the Zeitgeist since the publication of Acemoglu and Robinson's Why Nations Fail last year) before asking for an exemption to the Endangered Species Act”.

A review of that book summarizes the question as follows:

“Why are some nations rich and others poor, divided by wealth and poverty, health and sickness, food and famine?
The answer is that it is man-made political and economic institutions that underlie economic success (or the lack of it). Korea is a remarkably homogeneous nation, yet the people of North Korea are among the poorest on earth while their brothers and sisters in South Korea are among the richest.
South Korea forged a society that created incentives, rewarded innovation, and allowed everyone to participate in economic opportunities. The economic success thus spurred was sustained because the government became accountable and responsive to citizens and the great mass of people”.

Tanzania is not alone in this failure. But meanwhile Alexander Songorwa, as Marc Bellemare says, should clean up his own institution. Until such time he cannot be taken seriously in promoting continued trophy hunting with failed and corrupt formulas and mythical wildlife numbers.  

Picture credit: http://bit.ly/102tgo9

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                                                          Keeping my eye on you Edna

During the past CITES meeting in Bangkok, South Africa kept pushing for the legalization of the rhino horn trade. Typical of strategies employed by other countries with vested interests in particular issues, South Africa sent a large delegation and high-ranking politicians in order to persuade other parties to side with them. Edna Molewa, the SA Environment Minister, was much in evidence in Bangkok, as was Pelham Jones, the Chairman of the South African Private Rhino Owners’ Association. Many “side events” on legalization of the trade were organized and SA delegates took full advantage of the furore in the media surrounding the rhino poaching crisis in their country to tout theories about legalizing the trade.

In 2010 333 rhinos were poached, 448 in 2011, 668 in 2012, and perhaps already 170 in 2013. Deviating from previous announcements concerning her determination to take strong measures to stop the poaching, Molewa now says “The reality is that we have done all in our power and doing the same thing every day is not working” according to the SA Mail and Guardian newspaper. One could question Molewa’s resolve to combat poaching in the past, but she now seems resigned that no matter what is being “done” by the police, customs, Army, rangers, security guards, fences, etc – it is a losing battle.

So now Molewa, doubtless guided by the Private Rhino Owners’ Association, decided to push for legalizing the trade. In a coordinated campaign, many in the SA delegation sought interviews and organized events to push the message “more of the same [i.e. more of the same complacency] will not work”.

Pelham Jones even mentioned that “Anti-trade organizations are aiding and abetting illegal trade without a better solution” with typically convoluted reasoning. No mention, of course, was made of the complete shambles SA has made of proper investigations of the trade, catching those involved, adequately prosecuting those caught, and handing out stern and deterrent sentences. And that SA is actually responsible for the wave of poaching by allowing “pseudo-hunting” by Vietnamese and their proxies that created a supply and stimulated more demand.

Remember that rhino poaching was virtually non-existent before 2008. Over the five years 2006-2010 SA exported 394 trophies and horns to Vietnam legally, but this was obviously not enough.

Edna Molewa went on to state “The model that we have is based on pure law of supply and demand. Economics 101”.

But is it really?

 The laws of supply and demand of rhino horn, I’m sorry to inform Molewa, are anything but Economics 101 or 201 or 301. The level of demand is not known, and the numbers of people who will be demanding rhino horn if it is legalized is not known. For example, the acting head of Vietnam’s wildlife trade authority said it was “bullshit” that Vietnam was even a consumer. It all goes to China he said, despite significant evidence to the contrary of Vietnam as a major consumer of illegal horn. China says exactly the opposite, mentioning that there is no trade in rhino horn in China as it was made illegal in 2004 – again despite all evidence to the contrary including the existence of several rhino farms engaged in manufacture of pharmaceutical rhino products.

In this environment of denial and counter denial that there is a market for rhino horn in Vietnam and China coupled with an intense demand for “pseudo-hunting”, live rhino trade, and illegal trade in rhino horns, how can any level of demand be established?

Will Vietnam and China, who deny any consumption of horns and in fact say it is illegal to trade in rhino products, now suddenly wish to participate in the legal horn market?

And realistically, given that both China and Vietnam are likely involved up to their necks in the illegal rhino horn trade, how much horn would they demand if it becomes legal? There is no ready answer to that, but one can make some educated guesses. Despite lax enforcement, it is still not really that easy to shoot a rhino and transport the horn to Vietnam. Yet in 2012, in the region of 700 rhinos were poached in Africa to supply the illegal market (from SA, Namibia, Kenya, Zimbabwe etc). Demand is at present kept down because of the difficulty in obtaining the horn, and hence the price of rhino horn in Vietnam is currently estimated to be about $60-65,000/kg. Nevertheless, there is a thriving demand, and that demand will only grow if there is a legal supply. If the demand created by legalizing horn grows as expected in China and Vietnam, the supply from the 4,000 to 5,000 rhinos (of all ages) in SA private hands will not meet the demand, prices will go up, and poaching will climb again. 

Next, how will the market be regulated, and what will the sale price of legal horn be?

Certainly nowhere near the current black market price. However, if the legal price stays high it will not stop poaching as there is no incentive for poachers to halt their activities. After all, a poached rhino horn is priced in terms of the cost of obtaining it, which is minimal compared to the profit to be made selling it even if the legal price will be put at half or even 1/3 the current black market price. Elephants are being poached at a great rate even though the price per kilo of raw ivory is perhaps $4,000/kg. Poaching will continue as long as there is a profit to be made, and the legal price will have to remain high if the selling and buying governments can have any hope of limiting the demand. In other words, there is no way at all to undercut the illegal trade by placing legal rhino horn on the market.

I have mentioned elsewhere that the moves made to influence CITES delegates in Bangkok by SA delegates, the offered hosting of the next CITES convention in Cape Town, and the language emanating from SA politicians, highly placed officials and vested interest lobby groups all point to one thing. There will be tremendous lobbying and pressure applied to be able to sell rhino horns in the years to come.

Sadly, statements made by the Private Rhino Owners’ Association are clearly based on expected large profits rather than a well-thought out model to conserve remaining rhinos. What SA needs to do to limit poaching is to stop being complicit and complacent and take strong action. What China and Vietnam need to do is admit they are consuming illegal rhino horn and put real measures in place to stop trading in illegal wildlife products.

Some recent steps in the right direction to close loopholes in the “pseudo” trophy hunting trade were made at CITES. Initially, Ireland, on behalf of the EU and Croatia, supported by Kenya and Israel, proposed excluding all hunting trophies from exemptions for personal and household effects. This worried South Africa, Canada, Mexico, Namibia, Botswana and the Safari Club International. The proposal was watered down but still removes personal and household effects exemptions for rhino horn and elephant ivory and was accepted by the Conference. Since rhino trophy hunting permits are no longer extended by South Africa to citizens of Vietnam, this will also affect proxy hunters employed by Vietnamese in the Czech Republic, Poland, Denmark, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Thailand and the USA.

Before SA gets too far down the line with their fanciful proposals to satisfy the “demand” from China and Vietnam, all nations should ban the trade in rhino products. If that means a failed business model for the Private Rhino Owners’ Association, so be it.  Legalizing the horn trade will make financial profits for some, but will not profit the rhinos at all.

Picture credit: africajournalismtheworld.com

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