Pieter's Blog

I recently contacted a friend of mine, Sam Wasser, about ivory poaching. Sam is now Professor of Biology and Director of the Center of Conservation Biology at the University of Washington, and conceptualized and coordinates the ivory DNA forensics project.

First, Sam had to collect DNA samples from living elephants and did this by extracting DNA from scats to create an extensive reference library of populations across Africa. Next, by extracting DNA from tusks seized by customs and police in various parts of the world, Sam can now trace back where the tusks came from, and with increased numbers of reference samples, can pinpoint locations of where the ivory was poached to within a few hundred kilometres. This means, even  given the extensive movements elephants are capable of, Sam is able to identify with increasing accuracy the populations exposed to poaching pressure.

But let’s back up a bit. Between 1979 and 1989, at least 700,000 elephants were killed for their ivory across Africa, and 70,000 of those were poached in the Selous Game Reserve in southeastern Tanzania alone. The proceeds from the ivory ended up in many pockets and even funded the needs of armies engaged in civil wars. In 1989 Tanzania declared its own war on poaching, and with the combined forces of the army, the wildlife department and the police was able to put an end to most of the illegal offtake. That same year, six African elephant range states including Kenya and Tanzania submitted proposals to CITES that resulted in the ivory trade ban. With most importing countries enforcing the ban, the trade in illegal ivory practically stopped, and western nations contributed substantial sums of money to antipoaching efforts. In a 2009 article in Scientific American (July 2009: 68-76), Sam called this “probably the most effective act of international wildlife legislation in history, and public pressure was instrumental to its success”.

Since then, however, the illegal trade has revived spectacularly. Sam believes this resulted from a diversity of factors – the Western aid dried up, southern African nations opposed the ban as they felt they had done well to protect their elephant populations and should not be penalized with a trade embargo, demand from increasingly wealthy individuals in Far Eastern nations grew, and a number of one-off ivory sales were agreed by CITES.  In the Scientific American article, Sam mentions that by 2006, poaching had arguably reached levels exceeding those before the ban. International crime syndicates had become involved as ivory smuggling was relatively easy and driven by very high prices – rising from perhaps $200 per kilo in 2004 to an estimated $6,500 in 2009. Based on the amount and number of seizures made, it was estimated that 8% of Africa’s elephants were being poached every year, higher that the 7.4% rate that led to the ban in 1989.

So where did all these elephants come from? Such information, Sam argues, can bring pressure to bear on the nations with poor records of antipoaching operations. He and his team analysed DNA from ivory made in three 2006 seizures – 5.2 tonnes in a harbour in Taiwan, 2.6 tonnes in a Hong Kong apartment, and 2.8 tonnes in a harbour in Japan. Despite numerous requests, the Japanese authorities did not allow Sam to sample their confiscated ivory, but the Taiwan and Hong Kong seizures were analysed.

All came from the Selous ecosystem, with spillover from Niassa in northern Mozambique.  Previous (2002) shipments seized in Singapore came from Zambia. PIKE, an index of poaching threat, rose from 22% in 2003 to 63% in 2009 in the Selous. The same measure climbed to 88% in 2008 in Zambia.

Tanzania applied to CITES to downlist their elephants to Appendix II in 2006 (allowing trade), withdrew the application, but resubmitted in 2009. Tanzania (and also Zambia’s) applications to CITES were defeated at the 2010 CITES Conference of Parties in Doha. Currently, all African elephant populations remain listed on CITES Appendix I, except those of Botswana, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Namibia, which are on Appendix II.

In a 2010 article in Science (327: 1331-1332), Sam and co-authors point out a number of failures of monitoring programmes, lack of data needed for scientific assessments of levels of poaching, and a continuing reluctance within CITES to place science above politics contributing to overall uninformed decisions on trade. The inference is that Tanzania and Zambia’s abilities to address the challenges of illegal poaching are compromised despite their claims of conserving elephants. 

Clearly, a renewed effort is needed to ensure the proper protection of elephants. There is considerable disagreement whether the legal ivory sales from national “stockpiles” (natural deaths and elephant culling) allowed by CITES and campaigned for by some elephant range states (with proceeds often promised to assist elephant conservation) has led to increased poaching. Such debates often lead to acrimony, but clearly, the legal trade cannot satisfy the demand generated in the Far East. Sam argues that if the data is not available or made available, a precautionary principle should be applied before elephants are downlisted and legal trade is allowed.

Recently, we have seen worrying levels of rhino poaching, and some would argue that the way to end this trend is by allowing nations like South Africa to sell their stockpiles, and for private rhino owners to sell horns as well. The rationale is that by flooding the market with legal products, the poaching will stop. South Africa is similarly defending the right to sell lion bones to the Far East. We do not believe that such measures can begin to supply the demand by legal means; indeed it seems to stimulate further demand and thereby encourages poaching. There are just too few rhinos, lions, and elephants left to supply a booming market that does not discriminate between legal and poached products. Poaching must be stopped by using scientific information like Sam is gathering to pinpoint hotspots followed by enforcement and court cases to break up the syndicates and their local supporters. And the public must continue to play a significant role in calling for the necessary reforms. 

 Image: 2002 Singapore ivory seizure, Benezeth Mutaboya

We had always assumed that Zambia could be following a programme of sustainable trophy hunting of lions. Meanwhile we were concerned about the numbers of quotas issued, the lack of information about the impact of trophy hunting on utilized populations in hunting concessions, and the benefit to communities supposedly involved in sharing trophy hunting profits.

But now we are alerted to something quite alarming. According to the official CITES website, Zambia exported 193 lion trophies in 2010. In the past five years leading up to 2010, Zambia exported an average of 65 trophies each year.  So where did all the trophies representing a 300% increase over past years go?

CITES official records indicate that 42 suddenly went to Canada (average over the past five years = 0.6 lions) and 105 trophy lions to Russia (average over the past years = 1.2 lions).

What is going on here? The IUCN in 2006 estimated that Zambia had between 600 and 1,400 lions of all ages and sexes. There is no way that an export of 193 lion trophies in a single year is by any means sustainable given those population estimates.

Is CITES wrong? Were old skins perhaps mistakenly labelled as hunting trophies by Zambia?  Or was there a Russian and Canadian joint hunting convention in Zambia in 2010? Questions posed to the Zambian CITES authorities have not been answered, but we will keep you informed as to progress. 

A sea change of attitude among leading researchers about the importance of FIV infection among lions? Yes it was, and will now perhaps lead to a better investigation of the effects of this pernicious disease that could significantly influence conservation priorities of remaining lion populations.  

In a recent article Emerging Viruses in the Felidae: Shifting Paradigms in the journal Viruses (7 Feb 2012, v4, pp 236-257) Steve O’Brien and his colleagues indicated a rather big shift in their previous paradigm about the effect of FIV on lions. For many years, O’Brien had been a foremost proponent of FIV infection being inconsequential among lions – after all, his research group had shown that the virus had most likely infected lions for many thousands of years, and despite high infection rates in places like the Serengeti and the Okavango, lions did not seem to be displaying negative effects. This view ignored some important pathological data gathered from an Italian zoo lion infected with FIV (Poli et al, 1995, J. Wildl. Diseases 31(1): 70-74) and immune system information from lions provided by Kennedy-Stoskopf since 1994. Basically, those studies contested what O’Brien and colleagues had been saying and were repeating, and indicated similar pathologies and consequences of infection to those among domestic cats that should have been taken seriously.

Niels Pedersen, a friend at the University of California School of Veterinary Medicine, was the first to discover the Feline Immunodeficiency Virus in 1986. He was able to isolate this “new” virus from a domestic cat brought in to the Veterinary Hospital presenting symptoms and signs he recognized from monkeys infected with Simian Immunodeficiency Virus. Once the cat immunodeficiency virus was described, it became clear that the infection showed a similar progression of immune system compromise as had been noted among humans affected with HIV. Consequently, with an animal model, a great number of experimental protocols could and were designed with domestic cats to determine outcomes of infection with an immunodeficiency virus. Niels never believed that infection with such a virus could be inconsequential among lions.

Meanwhile, O’Brien and his co-workers (including virologists and veterinarians) seemed unaware of the very many journal articles detailing a great diversity of consequences of infection with FIV among domestic cats. Instead of using such information as a possible model of infection consequence among lions, they felt that lions had worked out some sort of “truce” with the virus. Why did they take this track?

First, O’Brien and his colleagues looked at the divergent genetic sequences of the FIV strains infecting lions, and came to the conclusion that this was an old association between this virus and a big cat (perhaps over 300,000 years?). Making another leap, they decided that all long-term associations between a virus and host inevitably resulted in a compromise – and used examples like measles and smallpox for example. There are of course elements of truth in this, as selection works on host immune systems to become better resistant to viruses and also on viruses to diminish the lethal effects on their hosts so the viruses have the opportunity to spread. But that is not the way immunodeficiency viruses operate – they mutate rapidly, shuffle parts of genomes among co-infecting FIV strains, and are not in themselves immediately lethal. Selection on an immunodeficiency virus has more to do with better avoidance of immune responses than accommodating longevity of the host. That is already built into the virus modus operandi (see below).

Second, O’Brien et al were looking for an immunodeficiency virus/host association that was not greatly negative to the host to perhaps decipher genetic mechanisms for resistance. This would then lead to a better understanding of how HIV infection among human populations could perhaps be mitigated. Direct studies of human populations had already led to an understanding that western Europeans had higher levels of resistance to HIV infection than, say, African populations. O’Brien and colleagues attributed this to possible effects of exposure by Europeans to a great diversity of pathogens in the past – for example the numerous outbreaks of plague in the Middle Ages that perhaps fortuitously selected for a particular genetic makeup among survivors -  that then provided a better chance of surviving the future challenge of HIV centuries later. But any hopeful level of accommodation with FIV was not to be found among lions.

Third, researchers wrongly interpreted the way immunodeficiency viruses actually affect their hosts. Proof of infection via antibody analyses proved to be at very high levels in some populations – close to all adult lions in the Okavango and the Serengeti for example. But lions were not dying in huge numbers, and infected individuals seemed perfectly healthy for years after they had been diagnosed positive. Surprise, surprise?  Not really, as that is the way the virus works. After an initial illness following infection, the virus then settles down to work slowly (it is after all a lentivirus) but inexorably to erode the immune system. Animals and humans can indeed seem apparently healthy for years after first infection as the immune system remains largely functional and is perhaps supplemented by a variety of secondary defence mechanisms (e.g. hormones, B-cell activation mechanisms independent of T-cells). FIV infection among lion populations thus did not present as an epidemic. This should have been expected, but instead it was used as evidence for co-adaptation and justification for misplaced hypotheses.

In hindsight, it was compromised science. After negating the consequences of FIV infection among lions for many years, and therefore significantly supporting the hopeful view that the infection was inconsequential, O’Brien and his colleagues finally acknowledged some cracks in the façade. In the paper mentioned above, O’Brien admitted that their past conclusions were premature and oversimplified. He refers to a study undertaken by Melody Roelke (a veterinarian in his group) among Botswana lions and added the following remarks:

a) “A marked depletion of CD4 bearing T-lymphocytes was apparent in FIV infected lions, a prelude to immune collapse in well-defined AIDS [Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome];

b) In addition, there were multiple elevations of opportunistic infections… further, spleen and lymph node biopsies from nine free-ranging lions revealed evidence of lymphoid depletion, a hallmark of AIDS in human[s], cats, and macaques [a primate] … these findings strongly suggest FIV is contributing to the loss of immune competence among these lions;

c)  These observations would suggest that infection with FIV … might have increased the risk of mortality upon secondary CDV [Canine Distemper Virus] infection [during the CDV outbreak in the 1990s];

d) … the striking influence of FIV on lion immune function … clinical disposition, and a potential ancillary role in CDV mortality … affirms that FIV is likely pathogenic among lions … FIV is a potentially harmful agent in free-ranging lions, as for housecats, and deserves further scrutiny in the other free-ranging species afflicted with FIV.”

While this is good news for a belated recognition of the importance of FIV infections among lions and their resulting fragility, it also places FIV back in the mainstream of concerns for the future survival of lions. There are perhaps five or six populations of lions that number over 1000 individuals of all ages. On these populations rests the hope for the future survival of the species in Africa, and they largely occur in protected areas. Such populations are not protected from disease, and cannot be cured of FIV. Future conservation and management of the species can now move on to incorporate disease components with the brave admission from O’Brien’s research group that what they said in the past about the consequences of FIV infection among lions was “premature and oversimplified”.

We now need to move forward in a united determination to design the best conservation plans for this greatly threatened species. The threat from disease can finally unanimously be taken seriously among FIV compromised populations (basically all the five or six large populations mentioned above), and must be included in all conservation programmes as now there can be no more distractors.

 Picture:  Science Photo Library

South Africa has led the field of “conservation”, or so they say, by placing wildlife species in private hands. With the tremendous growth in game farms (largely as a result of environmental destruction by previous cattle ranching on those lands), there was a significant demand for wild species. These animals were supplied by auctions among the private owners as well as the State selling “surplus” wild animals to private individuals.

In the case of rhinos, this scheme of private ownership has been hailed as a great conservation success. There is frequent mention made of the great increase in both black and white rhino numbers since they were placed on game ranches. Indeed, the overall rhino numbers in South Africa now exceeds 22,000 animals, and a significant percentage of these animals are in private hands.

However, it is questionable to what extent such “private” rhinos contribute to conservation of the species. These animals are virtually all bought, sold and traded much like domestic cattle, and only exist because of the commercial value they represent to their owners. Owners had in the past two main options to profit from rhinos on their land – photographic tourism and trophy hunting.  Now, however, there is the option of selling horns, and there is a move among private owners to call for legal trade in horns given their rising monetary value in Asia.

South Africa already has an established legal trade in rhino horns and trophies;  for example, CITES trade records indicate an increasing trend in SA horn exports (17 in 2007, 16 in 2008, 90 in 2009, and 158 in 2010 – note that 2010 numbers are all preliminary at this stage since records are still being compiled). Where are the horns exported to? Many different countries, but increasingly to Vietnam (2 in 2007, 2 in 2008, 62 in 2009, and so far 93 in 2010). It should also be noted that Vietnam is becoming a major destination for rhino hunting trophies. This is strange as Vietnam (unlike let’s say the USA, Spain, Russia, and France) is not known as a country with many avid trophy hunters. It should have been clear long ago to those who issued the permits that these were all “pseudo” trophy hunts – the price that could be fetched for the horns once they arrived in Vietnam far exceeded the trophy hunting costs. Indeed, it has been reported that many of the “trophy hunters” who arrived to collect their rhinos on permit had never shot a gun before and relied on the accompanying “professional” hunters to shoot the rhino for them.

Basically, South Africa opened the floodgates by engaging in legal commercial trade of rhino horns and hunting trophies with countries like Vietnam. At a very basic level, economic theory involves supply and demand. We all know the situation is more complicated than that, and we can also say that fuel feeds a fire. Indeed, there is a direct relationship between the increased trade in rhino horns and “pseudo” trophy hunting with an increased level of poaching (83 rhinos poached in SA in 2008, 122 in 2009, 333 in 2010, and 448 in 2011). Once a supply is established, the demand grows by whatever means of delivery.

So how does this affect lions?  Well, what we are seeing now from CITES, SA lion export records are parallel to what was seen for rhinos a few years ago. Lion bones are increasingly important to the Asian traditional medicine trade – largely because the tigers that used to supply bones are now a bit thin on the ground. In recent years, South Africa has replied to this demand. In 2009, 250kg of lion bones were exported to Laos, followed by 556 bones in 2010. As these are CITES export records, we cannot tell you how 566 individual bones correspond to 250kg of bones, but only report to you that very few bones were exported to Laos before this date.  In 2010, 14 live lions were exported to Vietnam – why? In 2010 (so far- see above for reliability of these recent numbers) 29 skeletons went to Laos and 19 to Vietnam. Laos received 90 lion teeth and 6 skulls in 2010, and the numbers will increase.

Also worrying and similar to the rhino scenario – Laos has now become a lion trophy hunting country. Yes indeed, Laotians have discovered a very recent desire to go to South Africa to “hunt” lions – 43 trophies so far were exported in 2010 versus zero trophies in all previous years. Reminiscent of the Vietnamese rhino hunters?

The South African authorities at the Department of Environmental Affairs tell us this is all above board and largely represents bones from lions in captive breeding programmes (canned lions). We say the demand has been fuelled, and since history tends to repeat itself, we might begin to see an upsurge of lion poaching incidents parallel to current rhino poaching.

Our message to South Africa? Please do not allow yourself, legal as you might claim it is, to get engaged in exports to Asian countries demanding lion bones and derivatives.  It will stimulate an illegal market involving wild lions in all African range states. It will promote poaching of lions as it has stimulated poaching of rhinos by allowing exports to fuel Asian markets – and that market for African wildlife products is insatiable. It might be said the bones derive from captive bred lions, an industry promoted to satisfy trophy hunters by shooting lions in enclosures. Well done for commerce. 

 Asian markets used to be supplied by Asian species. Those are now gone, lost, poached to extinction, and Asia has turned to Africa. Asian markets put a premium on wild animal products as they are “stronger” than captive raised animals. Remember that the “tiger farms” in China raise animals under deplorable conditions to be killed for the medicine market much like  lions are raised under deplorable conditions to be killed for the hunting market.  And finally, remember that there are as few lions on the African continent as there are rhinos in South Africa alone.

The success of a programme can be measured in two ways: gaining support amongst those who espouse the basic precepts, and a rush to seek compromises for those opposed. In terms of regulating lion trophy hunting, both measures apply. 

Since the UK Parliamentary debate on the conservation status of African lions in November 2010, LionAid has made considerable strides in alerting the public and decision-makers to both the great decline in lion numbers over the past 50 years and the additive effect that trophy hunting has made on these populations. Support is growing in Europe and among African range states to place lions on Appendix I of CITES. This move will not by itself stop trophy hunting, but will place the practice under much more careful scrutiny and impose greater limitations. Also, since import permits are required for Appendix I species, a diversity of countries are now free to make their own assessments of the trade.

In addition, we expect that the IUCN will officially designate western and central African lions as “regionally endangered” in line with their small, fragmented, and declining populations (that are still trophy hunted in Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Benin, and the Central African Republic). The IUCN has been inattentive to this deserved designation, especially now that researchers at Leiden University have conclusively shown that western and central African lions are substantially genetically distinct from those in eastern and southern Africa.

Suddenly, we are perhaps therefore seeing a flurry of calls to persuade that trophy hunting is of benefit to the species. For example, USA Today reported on a recent scientific article claiming that “limited lion hunting [is] better than [an] outright ban”. The article was written by Peter Lindsey, Guy Balme, Vernon Booth, and Neil Midlane.  Peter Lindsey has written a number of articles on trophy hunting since 2006, all of them calling for hunters to amend their ways and make lion trophy hunting more transparent and sustainable.  Lindsey always makes economic arguments, and the recent one is no different.

What is different is that Lindsey now acknowledges a bit of pressure. For one, he mentions that a consortium of what he calls “animal welfare organizations” in the USA has called for a listing of lions on the USA Endangered Species Act, and also mentions that LionAid is progressing towards import bans in the EU.

Lindsey et al’s arguments are based on finance rather than conservation. They threaten that by taking lions out of the equation, trophy hunting would become unviable across 59,538 km2 of currently designated hunting concessions, would result in massive expansion of “ecologically unfavourable” alternatives (livestock and agriculture), and would therefore result in greater mortality than trophy hunting. This is all supposition. Lindsey et al then predictably  produce the worn-out mantra that restrictions on lion hunting “may reduce the perceived financial value of lions, encouraging increased retaliatory killings for livestock depredation”, but then come up with something equally outrageous - “…over-hunting is likely to pose little threat to the long term persistence of lions so long as interventions are made to address excessive quotas where they occur … precluding lion hunting may therefore be a greater long term risk to lions than over-hunting”. So basically, over-hunting is fine according to them; better to over-hunt than not hunt at all.
 
To give Lindsey credit, he acknowledges that lions have been hunted at unsustainable levels (“… current profits from trophy hunting in some parts of Tanzania are probably unsustainable due to excessive harvests of lions”), and that “… a short-term moratorium on lion hunting could be considered to allow lion populations to recover…”. Also, he admits that “The trophy hunting industry is not dependent on lions for viability in most areas…”. The fact that his arguments have not made one iota of difference with the hunting industry does not seem to bother him overmuch.

Lindsey et al place too much trust in an arrogant and corrupt industry working with the support of corrupt government officials. The three major lion trophy exporting countries (excluding South Africa where there is clear evidence that captive bred lions are very significantly substituted for “wild” lion trophies) - Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe - have an average ranking of 2.7/10 on the Transparency International corruption index. Lindsey might be pushing for a kinder and gentler approach by the hunting community, but ignores the fact that such reform has hardly ever come from within the hunting industry -  it has to be imposed. Lindsey should carefully read very critical reports by Nigel Leader-Williams et al (2009) about corruption and trophy hunting and one by Baldus and Cauldwell (2004) on tourist hunting in Tanzania. The latter have this to say about the reasons for conservation failures in trophy hunting concessions:

• Non-effective control by the Wildlife Department;
• A lack of professionalism among the hunting operators;
• A lack of ethics and the absence of standards;
• Disregard of quotas;
• Lack of respect for environmental standards (especially in the camps);
• A decline of wildlife populations in hunting areas;
• Misplaced influence being exercised by the operators and highly placed officials in government;
• Resistance to make positive changes and truly involve communities.

Undaunted, Lindsey et al also drag out once again the magical figure of $200 million per annum that trophy hunters supposedly spend in Africa. He neglects to inform that half that figure applies only to South Africa, where game ranch hunting and captive bred hunting are greatly profitable. Lindsey and his co-authors also (conveniently?) neglect to mention a 2009 economic analysis of trophy hunting by the IUCN entitled “La grande chasse en Afrique de l’Oest: quelle contribution a la conservation?”.

Among many other conclusions, the IUCN report mentions the following:

• On average in 11 countries, 14.9% of the land area has been set aside for hunting, and the average contribution of hunting to GDP is 0.06%. This means they are the least economically productive lands in the country. Trophy hunting does therefore not represent economically valuable land use, especially in the context of the need to abate [rural] poverty and hunger.

• In total, 7 countries (Namibia, Tanzania, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, and Benin) have set aside 696,708 square kilometres (an area 2.8 times the size of the UK) for trophy hunting for a total employment of 9,703 people. It should be noted that for many, the employment does not exceed the six-month hunting season.

• In Zambia, returns from hunting in 2006 to the local population were about $1 million to use 22% of Zambia’s land. In Zimbabwe, each household (average 10 people) intermittently received between $1 and $3 per year. In Tanzania, 42 district councils received a grand total of about $1 million per year for the use of 250,000 square kilometres of land. In Benin, 300,000 people shared $70,000, so about $0.23 per person. The African country in which communities earned the least for land set aside for hunting was Tanzania, with an income of $4 per sq kilometre per year while the hunting companies earned about $110 per sq km/yr.

• Good governance is largely absent from the trophy hunting industry, and those in charge are not ready to share any level of control. Lack of transparency does not serve the State, local communities, or conservation.

While Lindsey et al speculatively contend that removing lions from the hunting menu would cause a collapse in the trophy hunting industry, this should not cause much concern. It is already an industry that functions only for the benefit of the operators and country elites to the disregard of communities, conservation of wildlife, and land management. That small group has until now had a monopoly on dictating how they want to (mis)utilize wildlife resources for their own benefits, but such activities no longer stand conservation scrutiny. To be effective in campaigning for the positive role of trophy hunting, Lindsey and his co-authors, as well as the Panthera Foundation (supposedly supporting the conservation of big cats worldwide, who employ Lindsey and co-author Balme, and who paid for the study) need to perhaps publish fewer vested-interest articles and actively engage in making changes to current trophy hunting malpractices.

Picture credit : http://bit.ly/Ac3aJh

Estimates of the numbers of African lions remaining on the continent have been assembled by a diversity of different methods. There is no estimate for lion numbers before 1950, but
several sources can be cited for estimates in the recent past:

• Myers (1975) wrote “Since 1950, their numbers may well have been cut in half, perhaps to as low as 200,000 in all or even less.”
• In the early 1990s, IUCN/SSC Cat Specialist Group members made educated “guesstimates” of 30,000 to 100,000 for the African lion population (Nowell and Jackson, 1996).
• Ferreras and Cousins (1996) developed a GIS-based model to predict African lion range and numbers; based on their data sources on extent of agriculture and pastoralism they selected 1980 as the foundation year for their predicted African lion population of 75,800.
• Chardonnet et al (2002) estimated an average total of 39,373 lions.
• Bauer and van der Merwe (2004) estimated an average total of 23,000 lions.
• The IUCN (2006) estimated a total of between 29,995 and 36,495 lions, or an average of 33,245 lions. It must be noted that since those numbers were published, new estimates have reduced IUCN numbers by 60 – 70% in western Africa alone based on actual counts. 

By whatever method of estimation, lion numbers clearly have susbstantially decreased in Africa. There is no doubt that expansion of human and livestock populations, reduction of prey and habitat, and conflict issues have historically contributed to the great declines.

However, despite these declines, lions continue to be trophy hunted in 11 African lion range states (Botswana currently has a moratorium in place, but allowed lion trophy hunting in the past). Over the past ten years ending 2009 when reliable records end a total of 6651 trophies were exported according to CITES. These do not include numbers of lion trophies shot by resident hunters and thus not exported. Lion mortality by trophy hunting should thus be considered a major contributory component to their overall decline in numbers, but this is largely ignored by the IUCN and CITES. In addition, this source of mortality is only peripherally considered by “experts”.

Historical declines in lion populations doubtless were due to all the factors listed above. But we are now at the point where lion populations are so decreased that we should consider carefully the more current relevant threats to their populations. And trophy hunting mortality statistics figure prominently, especially as they include an exclusive percentage of the population – adult and subadult males. Such animals are crucially important to the reproductive potential of lion populations, and high rates of male turnover in lion prides can significantly affect lion cub survivorship. 

So let’s look at some statistics of lion problem animal control versus trophy hunting mortality. This information is based on numbers provided by informed individuals as well as official numbers from wildlife department records. This is the same quality of data used to provide continental and national lion population numbers, and therefore should be as relevant as similar data presently guiding IUCN and CITES evaluations to conclude trade in lions (trophy hunting) is sustainable.

An overview for four countries from which information is available is presented in this table and details of the entries are discussed below:

Past statements about the primary causes of lion mortality:

1. IUCN 2006: Many in the cat conservation community, including the Cat SG and its affiliated African Lion Working Group (ALWG), did not consider the primary causes of this suspected decline to be trade-related (Nowell, 2004), and priorities for lion conservation have been identified as resolving human-lion conflicts and stemming loss of habitat and wild prey.

2. IUCN 2006: Indiscriminate killing of lions and depletion of their prey are the most prevalent and serious threats in Eastern and Southern Africa, followed by small lion population size. Habitat conversion and livestock encroachment also rank as significant threats. This Strategy emphasizes that lion trophy hunting is an important management tool that can provide benefits to local people and revenues to government conservation authorities, but stipulates that best practices should be implemented in the industry to ensure sustainability.

3. IUCN 2006: The top threats identified were indiscriminate killing of lions, hunting of lion prey for subsistence or bush meat trade, small population size, and livestock encroachment. Improperly managed trophy hunting was also considered to be adversely affecting several lion populations. The technical session … ranked a set of factors according to expected impact on the viability of all lion populations in the region. Trophy hunting was excluded from this analysis due to the difficulty of separating potentially negative biological impacts on lion populations from improperly managed offtakes from potentially positive socio-economic impacts on lion conservation. Properly managed trophy hunting was viewed as an important solution to long-term lion conservation.

4. IUCN Red List: A species population reduction of approximately 30% is suspected over the past two decades (= approximately three Lion generations). The causes of this reduction (primarily indiscriminate killing in defence of life and livestock, coupled with prey base depletion), are unlikely to have ceased.

5. Packer 2004: By far the most important threat to lions comes from problem animal control, and by putting lions on Appendix 1, the Kenyans would do much more harm than good. Tanzania has more lions than any other country in the world, and the majority of these animals live outside the national parks. If lion trophy hunting were stopped, they would have no economic value, and there would no longer be any incentive to conserve the lions. Opponents of trophy hunting have provided no alternative mechanism for funding the large-scale conservation efforts required to protect the species.

6. Frank et al, 2006: One report has blamed a local population decline on poorly regulated trophy hunting (Loveridge and Macdonald, 2003), but this problem appears to be restricted to Zimbabwe  and extensive retaliatory killing, snaring and habitat loss in the surrounding area are likely to be the major conservation risks to lions. Our opinion is that retaliatory and pre-emptive killing of lions by rural people, particularly livestock owners is the single greatest threat to lion populations.

7. Lion Conservation.org: The most urgent threat to lions today is the widespread use of poison in retaliation for depredation on livestock.

8. Whitman et al, 2007: Control of problem animals, antagonistic killing, poaching, and loss of habitat are more serious threats to lion conservation than legalized hunting. Control of problem animals represents the single greatest factor responsible for lion decline outside protected areas today.

9. Packer, 2010: Greatest threats to lions: Loss of prey, persecution in retaliation for cattle killing and man-eating and sport hunting.

But to what extent is retaliatory killing a major factor in overall lion mortality? Certainly it occurs, and apart from the actions of official wildlife department problem animal control units, it is illegal in most African countries (though rarely prosecuted  - and a troubling phenomenon in some countries (e.g. Namibia, Zimbabwe)  is the legalization of problem animal hunts sold by trophy hunting operators to clients, an issue that has little to do with problem animal control). Illegal killing is therefore kept secret, and accurate numbers are all but unavailable. Nevertheless, estimates can be made of the scope and extent of such retaliations. There are two means of evaluation – the actual threat lions pose to livestock, and the numbers and estimations of retaliatory and cultural killings from a variety of sources.

Livestock depredation by lions with real data

How important is the threat from lions in terms of cattle depredation that would result in such retaliatory killing? A study by Laurence Frank in the Laikipia region of Kenya where livestock, wild herbivores and predators co-occur is instructive. In 1998, Frank estimated that predator (lions, leopards, cheetahs, hyenas) depredation killed about 0.8% of livestock on large scale ranches, and an average of 1.7% of pastoralist herds. In contrast, disease killed 2.4% of herds on large scale ranches, and 8.9% among pastoralists’ herds. Frank did not mention effects of drought. In another study, Maclennan et al (2009) examined a compensation scheme established on the Mbirikani Group Ranch, also in Kenya. There, 55% of claimants attempted to be compensated by the predator fund for livestock lost in the bush. The pastoral grazers on the group ranch lost an average of 206 cattle, 22 donkeys, and 503 sheep/goats per year to predators, or about 2.3% of the herd. Eighty percent of the kills were attributed to hyenas, leopards and cheetahs, and 7% to lions – equivalent to losses from jackals (7%) and buffalos and elephants (6%). Despite compensation, about one lion was killed in each year of the study, and no mention was made of hyenas, leopards, or cheetahs being killed.

Other studies show similar trends – depredation specifically attributable to lions is low, and is far exceeded by other sources of mortality and loss like disease, drought, stock theft, and just wandering off. In addition, pastoralists are notoriously capricious when identifying sources of mortality. A study conducted by Christian del Valle (MS Thesis, University of Kent) showed that in Botswana, reported attacks by lions rose from 21% to 61% 1995-2003, those by leopards from 11% to 29%, and those by crocodiles from 0.7% to 8%, while hyena attacks declined from 52% to 2%. These increases and decreases were solely based on a decision by the Botswana government in 1997 to exclude hyenas from compensation and only allow payments for depredations by crocodiles, lions, and leopards. The livestock owners took note and significantly altered their reporting to only include “compensatable” predators. Similar over-attribution of livestock depredation to lions in other countries is highly likely.

Overall, better herding practices and the building of stronger night enclosures for livestock (bomas) would alleviate many problems. At present, especially in semi-arid countries like Botswana, the current free-range approach to livestock upkeep is begging for consequential depredation by any predator. In Tanzania, Packer and Ikanda (2008) noted a substantial difference in mortality among livestock herded by children versus adults. Simple and straightforward practices could reduce much predator/livestock conflict and therefore reduce retaliatory killings. However, with increasing human and livestock populations, the long-term viability of any co-existing predator population must be considered slim. 

Human/lion mortality

Much has been made by Packer and others about the estimated number of human deaths in Tanzania from lion attacks. In total, Packer recorded 563 human mortalities from 1990 to 2004, or about 37 per year, translating to about 8 people per 10 million in the Tanzanian population. The attacks were registered from numerous districts in the country. Without diminishing the tragedy of those deaths they have to be put into perspective as they have led to a demonization of lions and a strange justification for trophy hunting – essentially the sport hunters are doing the rural communities a favour by keeping man-eaters under control. Not only is this complete nonsense, but human deaths caused by lions are actually miniscule when compared to other sources of annual human mortality in Tanzania.

For a short list, in Tanzania 193 to 1499 people per year die of rabies-infected dog bites, 600 from snake bites, 1,900 from falls, 4,700 from drowning, 6,000 from asthma, 13,000 from road accidents, 14,000 from violence/homicide, 21,000 from malaria, 23,000 from diabetes, 35,000 from diarrhoea, and 122,000 from HIV/Aids/tuberculosis.  Tanzania ranks 21st highest among 220 countries in terms of an infant mortality at a rate of 6.7 per 1000 live births as of 2010. The number of humans killed by lions in Tanzania per year (37) is equivalent to the number of people killed in the USA per 100,000 inhabitants by lightning strikes. Lion attacks might make the news much as shark attacks do (over the past 50 years, only one person has been killed by a shark each year in Australia compared to 87 people who drown at beaches annually), but in reality the number of people killed by lions in Tanzania is miniscule compared to the hyperbole that such attacks have generated.

Most people killed by lions are out at night and unprotected. Packer and colleagues were able to assign specific times to such attacks – after sunset and between 6pm and 10pm in the evening on moonless nights. People were out at such times protecting their crops from elephants and other herbivores, and were attacked either in the fields (lion were also hunting crop raiding animals like bush pigs at the time) or on their journeys back and forth from their villages. As with livestock depredation, there would seem to be practical solutions available to avoid such mortality. But as mentioned above, the long-term probability of a dangerous predator population continuing to live in close contact with humans must be considered insignificant .  

Cultural/traditional lion killings separate from lion/livestock issues

In Tanzania, Ikanda and Packer (2008) recorded incidences of cultural lion killings (Ala-mayo) by resident Maasai in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area. Maasai morani (warriors) engage in such killings, though outlawed in the 1970’s, to demonstrate their courage and strength. Ikanda and Packer note that such killings are illegal and therefore not readily disclosed, but were able to document a minimum average of 2.2 lions killed annually for purely cultural purposes in the Conservation Area between 1985-2005. The authors noted an increase in such killings conforming to periods of time when new age classes were inducted as morani.  Such cultural killings not only pertain to the Maasai, and could be widespread across eastern and some parts of southern Africa. These cultural killings have little to do with retaliation, though Ikanda and Packer claim that stock-raiding lions can be killed for both cultural and retaliatory purposes.  They also note that such cultural killings, 2.2 lions per year, are much lower than trophy hunting quotas (24 males per year) in neighbouring hunting concessions.

Problem animal killings of lions – the available estimates

• Mozambique – Chardonnet (2009): 45 lions killed as problem animals 2006-2008, 15 per year.

• Namibia – Stander (2000): 30 lions killed per year as problem animals based on data from 1965-1994 collected by the Etosha Ecological Institute. These data are not particularly relevant to current problem animal offtake and trophy hunting rates as very few lions now survive outside Etosha National Park. Based on skin sales (likely all derived from problem animals), an average of 22 lions per annum were killed 1975-1994. 

• Kenya – Wildlife Extra: 18 lions killed/poisoned in 2010. Kenya has imposed a trophy hunting ban since 1977. Media attention to each death by poisoning is high, but the overall numbers of lions killed in Kenya in recent years for retaliation for livestock depredation is decreasing.

• Tanzania – Ikanda 2008: 73-77 lions persecuted in high human-lion conflict areas in 2007.

• Tanzania – Tarangire lion project: 13 lions killed per year in Tarangire region 2001-2004.

• Tanzania –  Tarangire lion project: 37 lions killed annually January 2004-July 2007 in Tarangire area.

• Tanzania – Personal communication : between 100-150 lions per year

• Botswana –  Rutina 2000: 19 lions killed per year as problem animals 1992-1998 in zones bordering protected areas in northern Botswana, most of them on the southern perimeter of the Delta.

• Botswana – Personal communication: 1999-2000, approximately 25 lions per year in the Okavango region.

Again, a picture very different emerges from that painted by those who feel trophy hunting is a minor source of lion mortality.

In Mozambique, 15 lions are killed as problem animals per year versus a minimum (data suggest several lions shot in Mozambique per year are declared for export in South Africa) of 21 trophies taken each year 2005-2009.

In Tanzania, numbers vary considerably, but 73 -150 lions have been proposed as a yearly problem animal control offtake versus an average of 196 lions taken as trophies taken on average between 2000-2009.

In Namibia an adjusted average of 22 lions is proposed per year for 1975-1994 problem animal mortality versus an average trophy yearly offtake of 25 lions 2005-2009. Lion trophy hunting is increasing in Namibia (by decade, 1975-1984: 12 lions, 1985- 1994: 127 lions, 1995- 2004: 121 lions, 2005 – 2009 (5yrs): 123 lions already and thus a projected decade total of 246 lions ). Few lions now remain outside strictly protected areas in Namibia (Stander 2010). 

In Botswana, 19 lions were killed per annum as problem animals 1992-1998, and perhaps 25 from 1999-2000, but during the same time 59 lions on average were exported as trophies. 

Overall, trophy lion exports exceed problem animal control numbers per annum in all those countries.

Conclusion

On the whole, the decrease in lion numbers in Africa could in past years have been correctly attributed to loss of habitat, loss of prey, and conflict. More recently, however, it is becoming increasingly evident that the remaining lion population has decreased to the point where other sources of mortality are becoming ever more significant. In their current small numbers, lions have negligible effects on actual livestock losses and threats to human lives. Lions, however, are perceived with past prejudices and are still subsequently killed out of proportion to the actual depredation they inflict on livestock. For some countries it is difficult to disentangle cultural killing from retribution.

In summary, sport hunting is now becoming the major source of lion mortality, and as the majority of trophies taken are from adult and subadult males, the practice is expected to have significant consequences on reproduction among hunted populations. The more relevant data becomes available, the more that this increasingly anachronistic practice should cease for the overall conservation benefit of the species.   

References

http://www.wildlifeextra.com/go/news/lions-poisoned011.html#cr
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18560_162-4894945.html?tag=contentMain;contentBody

http://bit.ly/w4HedH
 http://www.conabio.gob.mx/institucion/cooperacion_internacional/TallerNDF/Links-Documentos/Casos%20de%20Estudio/Mammals/WG5%20CS1.pdf
http://www.alessandrasoresina.com/allegati/progetti/updatereport2005.pdf
http://www.lionconservation.org/ScientificPapers/Living-with-lions,Frank.pdf
http://vh2q.com/no2-4.pdf
http://www.lionconservation.org/lion-poisoning.html
http://www.conservationforpeople.org/tarangire-lion-project/
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1989669,00.html
http://news.sciencemag.org/sciencenow/2011/07/man-eating-lions-attack-by-the-d.html

http://bit.ly/vu3JnX

 http://www.conservationforce.org/pdf/LIONS,%20CONFLICT%20AND%20CONSERVATION.pdf

http://bit.ly/veepDo
 http://www.worldlifeexpectancy.com/cause-of-death/
http://historylist.wordpress.com/2008/05/29/human-deaths-in-the-us-caused-by-animals/
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12075367
http://www.wildlifemanagementinstitute.org/PDF/18-Managing%20HumanLion%20Conflicts.pdf
http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?c=tz&v=29
http://bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/jeh5_05_45-50.pdf
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/27/opinion/australia-shark-attacks/index.html

Image: http://cb3communications.com/?attachment_id=1168

In a recent article  Alienor Cauvenet and co-authors from the Institute of Zoology, London looked at the impact of domestic dog canine distemper vaccination campaigns, the positive impact on lion populations in the Serengeti, and the possibly negative implications on cheetah populations in the same ecosystem. Basically, their conclusions were that the vaccinations and the resulting diminution of canine distemper virus in the ecosystem benefited one species (lions) but had a consequent negative effect on cheetah populations, as the subsequently rebounding lion population had adverse effects on cheetah reproduction. The article was written as a supposed cautionary message against promoting the conservation of one species over another.

The article was based on selective use of information, a lack of understanding of introduced diseases on susceptible carnivore populations, and evident unfamiliarity of evolutionary relationships among carnivore species. In short, it is no more than a series of assumptions.

But let’s start with a bit of history. In 1994 a canine distemper virus outbreak swept through the Serengeti, killing an estimated one third (1000) of lions in the population. The outbreak also killed lions in the Masai Mara and in the Ngorongoro Crater. The virus was isolated and genetically typed – but then compared to a South African strain in claims that it was a genetic variant of possibly higher virulence. The outbreak, according to authors in the journal Nature (Roelke-Parker at al, 2006), also affected hyenas, bat-eared foxes, and leopards. In the Masai Mara, an earlier outbreak resulted in local extinction of the African Wild Dog population (Alexander et al 1993, J. Zoo Wildl. Med; Alexander & Appel 1994, J. Wildl. Dis;  Alexander et al 1995, J. Zoo Wildl. Med), and a subsequent outbreak in the northeastern Serengeti killed more Wild Dogs in 2007 (Goller et al 2007, Vet. Microbiol). The outbreak also likely affected carnivores like jackals (Canis adustus, Canis mesomelas, and Canis aureus) at least. Canine distemper has a very wide host range, extending from Lesser Pandas to raccoons, canids to felids.

In response to the 1994 outbreak, Project Life Lion was established to vaccinate domestic dogs in the area, the source and maintenance host population for further epidemics. Was this necessary? I believe so. Canine distemper is an introduced and emerging disease among African carnivores. The virus, like the most prevalent form of rabies in Africa, comes from domestic dogs, a carnivore introduced by humans to sub-Saharan Africa and Tanzania not much more than 500 years ago.

After the distemper outbreak with high mortality among lions, subsequent sampling among a number of survivors indicated that 85% had antibodies. In other words, not all infected lions died, another widely observed consequence of canine distemper virus among a diversity of susceptible carnivores. With that level of protective antibodies among survivors, was the vaccination programme necessary among domestic dogs? The answer is again yes, as that maintenance host population will probably spawn repeated epidemics, and apart from lions, very many other carnivores will be affected.

Now let’s return to the paper by Cauvenet et al. Their assertion is that the vaccination programme (despite the evidence of protective antibodies among lions) was responsible for a resurgence in lion populations in the Serengeti, much to the disadvantage of sympatric cheetahs. They say that this “unintended” consequence of protecting one species (lions) with a vaccination programme of domestic dogs could lead to the demise of another species (cheetahs) – because lions kill cheetah cubs and adults.

 Not only do Cauvenet et al ignore the fact that a great number of other species were negatively affected by the distemper outbreak, they also ignore three other important pieces of information. First, lions and cheetahs have probably been interacting negatively on the African savannahs for tens if not hundreds of thousands of years. Lions also cause mortality among other sympatric predators like hyenas, Wild Dogs, and leopards. Lions are apex predators after all, and the composition of the entire predator and prey community is shaped by their presence. Second, tacitly accepting that an unchecked and introduced disease should alter this ancient formula to the benefit of a single species (cheetahs) is nonsensical. And third, their naïve acceptance that cheetahs are not themselves affected by canine distemper is unsubstantiated.

For example, studies in Namibia by Munson et al (2004 – J. Wildl. Dis) indicate that 24% of a sample of 81 free-ranging cheetahs in an area of likely contact with domestic dogs had canine distemper antibodies. They say “Antibodies against CDV were detected in cheetahs of all ages sampled between 1995 and 1998, suggesting the occurrence of an epidemic in Namibia during the time when CDV swept through other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. This evidence in free-ranging Namibian cheetahs of exposure to viruses that cause severe disease in captive cheetahs should direct future guidelines for translocations, including quarantine of seropositive cheetahs and preventing contact between cheetahs and domestic pets.”  Given the wide host range of canine distemper, it is very likely that cheetahs will also be susceptible, and suffer population consequences of an epidemic.

In summary, introduced and emerging diseases among wildlife populations should be actively addressed. Assertions that one species (cheetahs) might benefit from unchecked outbreaks among competitors (lions) are specious. Especially when such outbreaks could affect cheetahs themselves, and also have significant consequences on a great number of other sympatric carnivores. Cauvenet et al’s paper should  have been more vigilantly reviewed.

Picture: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Cheetah_portrait_Whipsnade_Zoo.jpg

It is tragic, but nobody really knows how many leopards there are in Africa. Nocturnal, solitary, elusive – no counts or idea whatsoever.  An unknown entity in terms of population numbers, but despite this greatly hunted. Supposedly all trophies are adult males (in actuality including subadult males and illegal females  - in Tanzania, females comprised 28.6% of 77 trophies shot between 1995 and 1998). All leopards are hunted on bait, and even hunted with dogs in some countries. How many trophies? From 2000-2009, a total of 9,861 from the major exporting countries. This number is likely to exceed 10,000 with new CITES record updates. That is 1000 trophies per year. Skins? Add another minimum of 1135 from 2000-2009. In addition, CITES only records exports, and therefore these numbers do not include any information from trophies collected by resident hunters. Resident hunters are likely to have collected a significant number of additional trophies in South Africa and Namibia for example.

The major trophy exporting countries were Tanzania (29% of total African exports), Zimbabwe (27%), Namibia (14% - with an increase of about 150% in exports over the last five years), and South Africa (11%). A few export surprises – Central African Republic with 340 leopards for example. The major trophy importing countries are the USA (49%), France (10%), Spain (8%), and South Africa (7%). Germany and Mexico trail with 5% each. Smaller numbers of imports were recorded by Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Portugal, Russia and Sweden.

Throughout Africa, the major threats to leopard population numbers are said to be habitat conversion and intense persecution, especially in retribution for real and perceived livestock losses. But trophy hunting is a highly significant added source of mortality. Perhaps even the highest source of mortality as with lions. Leopard males are infanticidal, and constantly removing reproductive males from the population by trophy hunting will have a cascade effect on future leopard reproduction. The IUCN and CITES list African leopards as “vulnerable”, essentially placing them in their convenient but inappropriate and irresponsible category of “don’t pay much/any attention”. 

What can be done? African leopards have few supporters, they are the “silent cats” in more ways than one. Trophy hunters have benefited. Time for all to pay some due attention. 

Picture: www. huntingreport.com

What we thought were protected animals could be and are now fair game. I will discuss two countries here, South Africa and Zimbabwe that have embarked on a slippery slope of condoning trophy hunting in National Parks, and the trend could well spread. It has to do with economics in South Africa and desperation in Zimbabwe, but is nevertheless a worrying trend.

Let’s start with South Africa first, that bastion of wildlife conservation that has given us “canned” lion hunts and white rhino hunts that have doubtless had a tremendous contributory effect on the current wave of rhino poaching. Kruger National Park (KNP) is bordered by four Associated Private Nature Reserves, and with an agreement to create a “Greater Kruger”, fences were taken down and wildlife is now free to move between the APNRs and the Park. Kruger is also bordered by community wildlife areas to the north and in Mozambique by the Sabie Game Reserve. Trophy hunting takes place in APNRs like Timbavati and Klaserie, and in 2009 the following quota was assigned: elephant 55, buffalo 144, impala 5003, lion 2, zebra 7, kudu 19, white rhino 7, leopard 1, etc. A safari operator, Thormalen and Cochrane advertises trophy hunting in Timbavati, mentioning that wildlife flows freely in from Kruger.

South Africa National Parks (SANParks) denies this, or at least attempts to. They would not like to be seen as condoning trophy hunting of animals that one day are protected in the National interest in Kruger and the next available to hunters in Timbavati. Undaunted, Gerhard Damm, board member of Conservation Force, a man highly cherished in hunting circles, and Editor of "African Indaba", a newsletter for sport hunters, recently came up with this solution for the financial woes of South Africa's National Park system:

"I understand that KNP must be run as a profitable business venture, especially in view of ever diminishing government subsidies and should not depend on taxpayer handouts. Hotels are a potential solution but come with an enormous ecological footprint and high capital and running costs. Strictly regulated conservation hunting operations, if conducted in restricted wilderness/remote zones of suitable parks, would probably far surpass the monetary profits of hotels, have negligible ecological footprints and most of all would be sustainable through the years without incurring any significant capital expenditure. David Mabunda, CEO of SANParks said not so long ago that “SANParks needs to find sustainable methods to fund the operations and protection of the entire national parks system and hence SANParks views responsible tourism as a conservation strategy.” Maybe it is time to evaluate conservation hunting as one more option. SANParks could produce sustainable NET PROFITS in the region of 40 to 50 million Rand annually from very limited and strictly controlled hunting without compromising the SANParks Conservation Strategy. The National Treasury could apply the subsidies paid to SANParks in the past to service delivery on many fronts. My proposal will be challenged with all kind of moralistic assertions that hunting simply cannot take place in National Park; but those who argue against should please consider that successful and sustainable conservation strategies rest on THREE pillars: Ecology, Economy and Social Politics."

Already hunted in the APNRs, Gerhard now wants to bring wildlife under the rifles of hunters within the Park as well, as it would add income. Seductive to cash-strapped KNP, but is it justifiable according to the statutes of a National Park? We shall have to see how this develops.

Now let’s consider Zimbabwe. As in South Africa, hunting concessions border directly on National Parks, and no pretence is made about luring animals like lions out of the protected areas with baits. No pretence is either made about shooting within protected areas, although this is “officially” illegal. Zimbabwe condones “ration hunting” in protected areas – the rations being provided to Park staff and perhaps some surrounding communities. Zimbabwe can barely pay their game scouts, but has opted to feed them with the animals they are supposed to protect. Such ration hunts are sold to clients by operators as “non-trophy hunts”, but at least one operator advertises a 5-day buffalo hunt where trophies are listed as non-exportable…but for a 60% additional fee a deal can be made. The company also mentions that the trophies make great photo opportunities.

In addition, and this is particularly worrisome, the wildlife authorities now apparently see the National Parks as a “source area” for the neighbouring hunting concessions. The purposes for which national parks are constituted under the Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Act is to “preserve and protect the natural landscape and scenery therein, and to preserve and protect wildlife and plants and the natural ecological stability of wildlife and plant communities therein, for the enjoyment, education and inspiration of the public”. Nothing in there about providing hunting opportunities? But this is what is now happening. Why? One could confidently assume that the hunting concessions have been shot out in the past, so that now they are dependent on an influx of animals (lured, attracted, enticed) from the protected areas to satisfy the hunting clients. Andrew Loveridge of Oxford University wrote about the great impact lion trophy hunting on borders had on populations within Hwange National Park, but this now seems to be condoned despite his observations of highly negative impacts.

Short-term and misguided profit taking is not conducive to long-term conservation programmes. But this is what seems to be happening in South African and Zimbabwean National Parks. We cannot have much influence on national policies in African nations about what is clearly a mining attitude towards their wildlife. But we can do something to prevent trophy imports to our nations, and seek more enlightened alternatives to the present reliance on income from trophy hunting. Gerhard Damm is not wrong to invoke economic factors in conservation. But that does not necessarily have to come from destructive utilization of wildlife resources, especially in their last mainstay of the protected areas.    

Picture credit: Rembrandt van Rijn

Richard Coniff, a reporter for the Atlantic, published an article in December this year called “The Circle of Life”. Coniff headed to Namibia with the intent of writing about lion trophy hunting and whether or not it was contributing to the conservation of lions. Yes indeed, he was going to sort this out. The result, of course, was a series of words on paper, badly researched, and paragraphs full of the drama when Coniff saw some lions from a vehicle.

He starts out full of vigour, reports that lion populations in Africa are declining, reports that they are increasing in Namibia (?), reports about the petition to the US Secretary of the Interior to put lions on the USA Endangered Species list, and reports on the community initiatives where concessions in Namibia have been given rights of ownership over the wildlife. So far so good.

He then says this: “I’m not a hunter, and turning lions into trophies has always struck me as a strange enterprise. But I was inclined to approve of it, in part because of the unequal character of such encounters—we are on foot, in their territory, with animals that can easily kill us”. Immediately he reveals how naïve he is – he has no idea that a lion “hunt” is conducted with baits, the hunter transported in a vehicle, the hunter equipped with a high-powered rifle with a telescopic sight allowing him to shoot the lion from distance, the hunter with odds stacked incredibly high in his favour. Does he really think hunters track lions on foot, slog around Namibian deserts and dunes, and that hunting is “fair chase”? To have done his research well, he should have joined an actual lion hunt.

Coniff then interviews a bunch of people – as journalists do. Craig Packer first, who trots out information from Tanzania to show that lions have been grossly overhunted –  “the only lions left out there with a mane and testicles are youngsters. A male lion needs six years to establish himself in a pride and rear a new generation. Overhunting leads to continual turnover in the pride: when a new male takes the throne, he tends to kill the old crop of cubs so he can father his own”. But when Coniff asked if Packer would support a ban on trophy hunting, he demurred.

Next on the interview list were Garth Owen-Smith, Namibia’s “leading conservationist” and Greg Stuart-Hill, a senior conservation planner for the World Wildlife Fund. Both were in support of lion trophy hunting, as it brings in a trophy fee of $10,000 or so in addition to the hunting fees – money talks and the communities would not kill lions eating their livestock anymore, as they now had “value”.

The article then fizzles out with a suggestion that photographic tourists might pay an extra fee to photograph lions.

Now let’s get to the nitty gritty about Namibia shall we? Things that Coniff should have mentioned but did not?

First, Namibia exported 188 trophy lions from 2000-2009 according to CITES. With a rising trend – 65 lion exports during the first five years of that period (2000-2004), and 123 lions during the latter five years (2005-2009). An increase of about 90%. The IUCN estimated in 2006 that Namibia had a lion population of 415-795 lions (all ages and sexes), some shared with Botswana. In the north, where almost all the hunting takes place, the IUCN estimated 315-595 lions (all ages and sexes), but Etosha National Park takes up over 50% of that area and protects most of those lions. Same old story in Namibia as all over Africa – the lions available in hunting concessions are over-harvested. So desperate are the lion hunters that they shoot males radiocollared by research projects (see below).

Second, Dr Philip Stander has a long-term research programme called the Desert Lion Conservation Project in northern Namibia outside the protected area of Etosha. “Flip” as he is known, has this to say about trophy hunting  – “The regularity, especially since 2004, at which male lions were shot or hunted, and the selection of adult males for trophy hunting, have resulted in a significant reduction of males in the population. It also contributed to vastly different age-specific mortality rates between males and females, that serves to illustrate the negative impact on the population. Increasingly skewed sex ratios, favouring females, have reached critical levels (2010 -  1 adult female : 0.18 adult male). Six of the nine major prides [in the research area where they are trophy hunted] are currently without a pride male”. Flip Stander was not interviewed by Coniff, rather a big journalistic faux pas.

Third, the Bush Warriors website had this to say - “It is with great sorrow that we report that the world, Namibia, and community-based conservation organization, Desert Lion Conservation (DLC), has lost an entire pride of rare, unique, desert-adapted lions over the span of just one year. Two days ago, the pride’s last remaining members—three females—were intentionally poisoned and found dead, putting an end to the genetics of a distinctive line of lions and wasting enormous conservation efforts, especially from the regional tourism industry. Tourists and conservationists are stunned over the news and extremely frustrated with the fact that an entire pride of these big cats have all been lost at the hands of man. DLC’s Dr. Phillip ‘Flip’ Stander calls it “the end of an era”. Bush Warriors also report that two of Flip Stander’s radiocollared males were shot by trophy hunters. This came out in July 2011,and completely ignored by Coniff. Bush warriors conclude – “The current situation of unsustainable hunting of adult male lions and the correspondingly negative impact on the non-consumptive tourism industry in Namibia is a serious problem.”

So – is the trophy hunting of Namibian lions conserving them? No in two important ways. Lions are being harvested at unsustainable rates from a small population, causing considerable disruption in pride structure and future reproduction. No also, because the communities supposedly so convinced of the “value” of lions are still poisoning them. At the end of the day the lion “conservation hunting” programme in Namibia has to be seen as the failure it is, and a big re-think is necessary. And please, no more “insight” from reporters like Richard Coniff who attempt to address complicated issues with superficial and badly researched articles. 

Picture credit: didimalasafari.com