Pieter's Blog

Welcome to Pieter Kat's official LionAid blog. Here you can follow Pieter's opinions, thoughts, insights and ideas on saving lions.

    Is this man supporting terrorism, insurgency, regional destabilization or just making a buck?

 

In recent years we have all been advised by a series of pundits that the trade in illegal wildlife products (ivory, rhino horn, lion body parts and cub smuggling, pangolins, shark fins, rosewood, ebony, sandalwood, etc, etc) is driven by criminal syndicates. Organized crime. We have been told the profits benefit terrorist groups, insurgent militias, and unscrupulous dealers and individuals who support them at high levels in government and in the business community. We have been told that wildlife crime contributes to the destabilization not only of governments but entire regions, and also will lead to the destruction of the wildlife populations that are so important to our global heritage. 

 

We are told that campaigns are mounting to stop the trade, including better law enforcement, better intelligence sharing, better customs controls, agreements between source and destination countries to better control supply and demand, more public and private funds being mobilized to control illegal offtake (anti-poaching), more awareness raising campaigns in source and destination countries to educate people about the consequences of buying and selling, etc.  This all sounds positive and encouraging.

 

However, a recent and excellent report from the Institute of Security Studies (The Evolution of Organized Crime in Africa – Towards a New Response; Mark Shaw and Tuesday Reitano, April 2013) shows that organized crime had been well established in many of the countries well before the recent poaching crisis; that organized crime has penetrated deeply into state institutions and private enterprises as a result of long and mutually beneficial associations; and that organized crime is highly flexible, responsive to new opportunities, and moves more quickly than policymakers can respond. States with dysfunctional governments (fragile states) are key areas of operation, but more stable states are key areas of investment of profits and also serve as regional hubs.

 

The ISS report, while not dealing much with wildlife crime, has some very important things to say and I recommend a careful read if you are interested in possible ways of reducing wildlife crime. The report makes these key points:

•Organized crime became established in the 1970’s largely operating from South Africa and Nigeria. At the end of the Cold War, many armed groups involved in local insurgencies sought alliances with foreign criminal groups to fund armed conflict. Increasingly, such criminal groups began to buy collusion at the highest levels in many states. In the new millennium, a consolidation phase started, and there is evidence of greater ownership and initiative of African criminal groups. 

•Nowadays, Nairobi, Johannesburg and Lagos form the core triangle of urban hubs involved in organized crime but cities like Cape Town, Dakar, Kinshasa and Addis Ababa also play distinctive roles.

•The report estimates that by 2010, Africa was linked in some way to 7-10% of the global illicit trade. The global revenue accruing to organized crime is thought to be in the region of $1.3 trillion. By contrast, legal African trade accounts for only 3% of global trade in goods and services and only 2.4% of global GDP in the legal economy. 

•West Africa has emerged as a major transit and repackaging hub for Latin American cocaine. At least 25 tons of cocaine per year is trafficked out of Guinea Bissau to Europe, with a street value of $4.29 billion.

•Nigeria, Ghana and Cameroon are ranked among the top world countries in terms of global cybercrime, valued at $600 million annually.

•The US State Department estimates that Kenya’s financial institutions launder over $100 million per year.

•Illicit trafficking of gold and natural resources, principally out of the Democratic Republic of Congo, is estimated to be worth $1.2 billion per year.

•Illicit financial outflows alone (money laundering) from Sub-Saharan Africa outpaced development assistance to the area by a ratio of 2:1. 

•Part of the problem in attempting to combat organized crime in Africa is that criminal networks are difficult to disentangle from the activities of warlords, insurgent groups, and even some political, military and community groups. 

•Increased demand for natural resources from Asian economies, most notably China, have led to many African countries becoming increasingly linked to China via the legitimate and illegitimate markets. It is estimated that the global value of the Chinese illegitimate market was $2.18 trillion between 2000 and 2009.

•The port of Mombasa has become notorious for linkages with organized crime. A previous report stated “Mombasa is like a tunnel. All illicit business happens here, and it is controlled by traders supported by customs personnel and powerful people in government. Whoever controls the port controls the illicit business in Kenya.” http://www.ipinst.org/~ipinst/images/pdfs/ipi_epub-kenya-toc.pdf

•Efforts by the international community to combat organized criminality in Africa have had minimal impact as there is minimal activity by the states themselves. There is a great need to combat the underlying reasons for the proliferation of organized crime in all sectors, including targeting income inequality, building a broad base for the rule of law and democratic governance, fighting corruption and increasing community-level participation. 

 

The authors sum up their report as follows:

 

•The traditional way of responding to organized crime has been to view it as a criminal justice or security issue requiring strengthened cross border and domestic law enforcement, border control and intelligence-gathering capability. However, it is clear from organized crime’s evolution across the continent that fighting this phenomenon can no longer be understood in terms of curbing the illicit trade. Given the almost continent-wide interdependence of organized crime and corruption at the highest levels, and the degree of entrenchment within communities, addressing organized crime in the future will also involve preventing and reversing the criminalization of governments and providing sustainable economic alternatives for its citizens. 

 

So where does this leave the efforts to combat wildlife crime, that by all indicators intend to proceed along lines that have not worked in the past? The authors have some suggestions for the overall situation and I combine these with some specific ones of my own:

 

•National ownership of any plan to control organized crime is crucial, and should not largely depend on the will of those in power. Citizens should insist on ownership of their natural resources and require that state institutions do not allow channelling of profits only to elites.  

•Rather than concentrating on combating individual criminal groups, the supply chains need to be closed down, necessitating cross-border and international collaboration. 

•There cannot be any level of impunity for those involved – lack of prosecution undermines citizens’ trust in democratic institutions and encourages new recruitment into illegal activities.

•There should be a strong emphasis on re-establishment of community and social control, and known members of crime networks ostracized rather than tolerated and even celebrated. Rather than expecting control to come from governments, there should be a much larger focus on grassroots initiatives. Key among these will be funding for projects stimulating alternative and sustainable income streams.

•Support to community structures, civil society organizations and independent media can provide momentum against organized crime where state institutions or political will are lacking.  

•Combating organized crime has always been a reactive process, playing into the hands of syndicates that are dynamic, flexible, opportunistic and very good at anticipating control measures, in no small part due to information received from penetrated institutions. Information gathering by international institutions is crucial, but is currently dominated by concerns about terrorism. A much more dedicated approach to specific wildlife crime activities is required.

•Those involved in wildlife crimes are often well-known to national and international agencies. While prosecution nationally could be a difficult issue given levels of immunity, certainly their names should be published (as are those of known drug kingpins) to discourage anyone dealing with them at international levels and international assets frozen?

 

We also need a much better definition of what constitutes wildlife crime. At present, it is accepted that the illegal wildlife trade ranks in the top five of illegal trade activities (after drugs, human trafficking, counterfeiting and weapons) and is worth somewhere between $7-$10 billion per year. However, wildlife crime is largely classified as “poaching” in very many African countries, and poaching carries very light penalties and fines. Also, the illegal wildlife trade has only recently been given significant prominence because Hillary Clinton said the profits were used by terrorist groups. 

 

So overall, the whole definition of wildlife crime lingers in a grey area. Is an ivory poacher an illegal wildlife trafficker? Is a middleman caught with hundreds of kilos of ivory supporting terrorism? If the ultimate destination of most of the poached ivory is China, is China therefore funding terrorism? 

 

Certainly, at present, those trading in drugs and arms are given high penalties when caught. But at a local level poaching is still treated as a misdemeanour. Until we know what actually constitutes illegal wildlife trafficking, and until appropriate penalties are assigned for various levels of involvement, we are no further in combating the crime, even though there is plenty of evidence that wildlife trafficking is conducted by organized crime syndicates. Until all those caught up in the rush of needing to combat wildlife crime come up with some much better definitions of what they mean by wildlife crime, and until they learn what they are up against from reports like that of the ISS, it remains a lot of flag waving parades banging drums. 

 

For further reading, see also this article

 

Picture credit: Standard Tribune

 

2 Comments | Posted by Pieter Kat at 10:39

Bluefin tunas bargained against elephants

                                                 

                                                   Save tunas? Only if you save elephants

 

 

This is an old report I came upon, but it clearly indicates how issues are handled at CITES meetings. 

The report can be found here.

 

 It concerns pre-CITES CoP15 (Doha, March 2010) negotiations between a group of 23 African nations (Kenya, Nigeria and Ethiopia are identified) and the EU bloc. The 23 African nations were concerned that the EU would allow Zambia and Tanzania to downlist their elephant populations to Appendix II so they could sell their ivory stockpiles (and engage in elephant trophy hunting, etc). So the group of 23 decided to apply a bit of pressure – we will vote to protect tunas if you vote against the Zambian and Tanzanian proposals.

 

"Please do not force our collective hand to cast our 23 votes against the EU on any of the issues it is supporting such as, for example, the high-profile proposed ban on bluefin tuna," they stated in a leaked letter seen by Reuters.

 

As you will remember, the elephants were not downlisted but the tunas were not protected – Japan was able to mobilize sufficient support to convince CITES that tunas should be looked after by the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (which had overseen the decline in the first place) so that tuna fishing could go on unabated. Tanzania tried again to have elephants downlisted with a proposal to CoP16 in Bangkok, but withdrew the proposal before the Conference. 

 

So anytime anyone says that CITES carefully considers trade in species based on scientific evidence and the “precautionary” principle, please remind them of the tuna. It is all secretive horse-trading and politics at the end of the day. 

 

 

Picture credit: www.lastwordonnothing.com

 

 

 If you have not already signed up to our mailing list, you can add your name here and keep up to date with our ongoing work and, most importantly, DONATE to support our work to conserve the remaining fragile lion populations. Thank you. 

Add a comment | Posted by Pieter Kat at 14:40

The EU to review regulations on imports of animals as trophies

The European Union has invited LionAid to participate in a review of current regulations concerning the import of hunting trophies of species listed on their Annex B (equivalent to CITES Appendix II). 

 

We feel this review is well overdue and therefore increasingly urgent. It should be noted that a number of EU Member States proposed a comprehensive review of current import practices by all parties at the recent CITES Conference, but this was watered down to only include elephant and rhino trophies. Such trophies belatedly have to be issued with import permits (not required before, an export permit from the country of origin sufficed) – in response to the rampant rhino “pseudo-hunting” scam facilitated by lax controls in South Africa. 

 

“Pseudo-hunting”, as you will remember, took advantage of a glaring loophole in CITES regulations where a “hunter” could legally export a rhino trophy and then quickly take advantage of the significant difference between the hunting price and the street value of the horn to turn a tidy profit. This is against the CITES rules, but to date there have been few successful prosecutions outside South Africa we are aware of (though arrests have been made in the Czech Republic and Slovakia). Such horns initially were collected by droves of Vietnamese hunters, but as eyes in South Africa slowly began to open (largely due to NGOs and the media raising questions), the syndicates began to recruit numbers of proxy hunters from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Denmark, Poland, Russia and the USA (countries, it might be added, with significant Vietnamese communities). 

 

Trophy horns imported by such “proxy hunters” have since not surprisingly been conveniently declared as “stolen”, “lost”, cut up and given to relatives and friends, etc.  

 

It is suspected that the same scenario applies to ivory collected by “hunters” in Africa – “cut-rate” hunts are offered by many agents and operators, the ivory is legally exported, and the tusks then “disappear”. Again, the EU is involved – CITES records indicate substantial increases in numbers of Danes and Portuguese, for example, showing a sudden interest in elephant hunting and significant discrepancies between numbers of exports versus imports. Ivory from hunts often seems to vanish into thin air.

 

The EU is proposing to “address” the issue by contemplating a requirement for import permits in addition to export permits for hunting trophies.

 

Lions fall in a different category, in that there does not appear to be an illegal trade in hunting trophies per se. However, we will advocate a complete ban on the import of lion trophies from South Africa. Such trophies virtually all originate from the captive breeding industry (“canned hunting”), are mislabelled as “wild” by South African authorities to allow hunters to place them in record books maintained by hunting organizations like SCI, and are hunted by very cruel techniques. In fact, the entire captive breeding for trophy hunting concept should have come under much greater scrutiny and sanctions in the past, but such was the attention given to rhinos, elephants and tigers that the industry was allowed to blossom and bloom. 

 

If the EU prohibits import of seal skins from Namibia and Canada on the basis that this industry is based on cruel practices, why not similarly ban imports of lion trophies emanating from the canned hunting industry? Since South Africa only exports captive raised lion trophies, a blanket ban would not be difficult to enforce as the issue of truly wild versus captive raised animals would not need to be considered. While over 60% of canned lion trophies go to the USA, significant numbers end up in Germany, France, Spain, etc in the EU. 

 

The necessity of an import permit for lion trophies from countries other than South Africa would also give the EU, under existing Wildlife Trade Regulations, greater latitude of ensuring that lion trophy hunting is indeed sustainable. This sustainability is currently claimed by the trophy hunting community but is increasingly being challenged by published information, surveys, and indeed the governments of Botswana and Zambia.

 

We will seek backing from our supporting organizations like IFAW, HSI, EIA and others to ensure that lions are not once again swept under the carpet in the exclusive stampede to conserve African elephants and rhinos. Desperate though the status of such species might be, concern needs to be spread to all species suffering from unsustainable commercial offtake whether it is poaching, “pseudo-hunting” or legalized trophy hunting.

 

 

 If you have not already signed up to our mailing list, you can add your name here and keep up to date with our ongoing work and, most importantly, DONATE to support our work to conserve the remaining fragile lion populations. Thank you. - See more at: http://www.lionaid.org/blog/#sthash.FDoAV1Yr.dpuf

Add a comment | Posted by Pieter Kat at 16:49

Thumbing their noses at CITES - Zimbabwe's ivory trade

                                                     It has been going on for a while.....

 


Few people realize that it is perfectly legal to buy ivory carvings in a number of countries – like South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, China, Thailand and Japan. The problem is, once you have bought it, you cannot export it. Well, except if you buy it in Zimbabwe or Namibia, where you can buy ivory carvings “for non-commercial purposes” (whatever that means, it probably makes sense to CITES?). Ivory carvings are also described as “worked ivory”, but there is no clear definition of what “worked” means – it could, for example, mean that it was “worked” into a chopstick, a simple bracelet, or even a bit of ivory with some “artistic” scratches on it.

 

After the Conference of Parties in Doha (2010) where such non-commercial trade in ivory carvings was authorised, CITES made a small change in the regulations. Before, Zimbabwe’s licenced domestic dealers were issuing “Short Export Permits” supplied as blank forms by the Zimbabwe CITES Management Authority, and only needed to be filled in and then endorsed by a Customs officer to permit the buyer to take ivory home. Acknowledging that that practice was a bit out of the ordinary, CITES decided to do away with permits issued by dealers and told customers to get a “real” export permit from one of the three Management Authority offices in Zimbabwe before being allowed to export their carvings. Not a big change really, and one probably ignored. In a corrupt country like Zimbabwe, CITES permits for practically anything can probably be bought with ease.

 

Zimbabwe is desperate to sell the ivory they have stockpiled. They were allowed to do so by CITES in 1999 when Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia were given permission to sell a total of 49 tons to Japan, and again in 2008 when Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa sold a total of 101 tons to China and Japan. However, the Zimbabwe National Parks & Wildlife Management Authority now seems to be $10 million in arrears and would like to sell the current stockpile for $8 million or so. Proceeds would go to antipoaching, enforcement, and Quelea control (Queleas are small seed-eating birds that join in huge flocks and can devastate crops). There was no proposal to CITES in 2013, but the Minister is eager to have one on the table in 2016.

 

Meanwhile, CITES trade records show that Zimbabwe has been doing quite well in ivory sales, thank you very much. CITES trade records only go up to 2011, and can only be considered partial for that year. Nevertheless, in 2010 and 2011 alone, Zimbabwe exported 101,651 grams of ivory carvings (83,256 grams to China and 12,670 grams to Slovakia as the major consumers); 3,141 kilos of ivory carvings (3,080 kilos to China); and 2,927 individual carvings (2,547 to China). That’s a lot of carvings in two years, all for non-commercial purposes of course, and doubtless all bought by hordes of Chinese tourists travelling to Zimbabwe.

 

Also, and this is where things get a bit shady as CITES only allows trade in “carvings”, Zimbabwe exported 1,207 kilos of ivory “pieces” to Japan in 2009; 10,910 kilos of tusks from 2009-2011 (2,798 kilos to China and surprisingly, 4,156 kilos to USA as major destinations; others include Germany, Spain, UK, Italy, Poland, Russia and Slovakia); and 515 individual tusks from 2009-2011 (128 to South Africa and 75 to China as major destinations; others include Germany, Spain, Ireland and Romania). All duly issued with export permits by the Zimbabwe CITES Management Authority and all duly registered in the CITES trade database. But what about the legality of those sales? These are not hunting trophies but an entirely different category of exports.

 

These ivory exports seemed to raise no eyebrows at the CITES Secretariat.

 

The way CITES operates is that member states (the Parties) are “requested” to abide by the rules set by the Secretariat and the Conferences of Parties, and that no Party trades with another in wildlife products that are not approved. CITES permits are however issued locally, and can create a shambles for CITES rules and regulations until such “irregularities” are detected and the Secretariat issues a warning. Being a rather secretive organization (maintained with our taxes) we are not allowed to know what Parties have been issued warnings and whether these were heeded.

 

Meanwhile Zimbabwe continues to trade in tons of ivory, seemingly ignoring the fact they are not allowed to sell any under current rules. In 2008 CITES allowed Zimbabwe to sell 3,700 kg of ivory legally. Since then and up to 2011, Zimbabwe has exported on the order of 19,842 kilos of ivory that are not “carvings”. To me, at current minimal prices of about $500 per kilo, it seems that would supply lots of funds to battle those pesky Queleas?

 

Picture credit: US Library of Congress: cph.3c02973

 

 

If you have not already signed up to our mailing list, you can add your name here and keep up to date with our ongoing work and, most importantly, financially support us to conserve the remaining fragile lion populations. Thank you.

 

Add a comment | Posted by Pieter Kat at 16:20

Legalizing the trade in rhino horn  - ongoing moves

                                                          Keeping my eye on you Edna

 

During the past CITES meeting in Bangkok, South Africa kept pushing for the legalization of the rhino horn trade. Typical of strategies employed by other countries with vested interests in particular issues, South Africa sent a large delegation and high-ranking politicians in order to persuade other parties to side with them. Edna Molewa, the SA Environment Minister, was much in evidence in Bangkok, as was Pelham Jones, the Chairman of the South African Private Rhino Owners’ Association. Many “side events” on legalization of the trade were organized and SA delegates took full advantage of the furore in the media surrounding the rhino poaching crisis in their country to tout theories about legalizing the trade.

 

In 2010 333 rhinos were poached, 448 in 2011, 668 in 2012, and perhaps already 170 in 2013. Deviating from previous announcements concerning her determination to take strong measures to stop the poaching, Molewa now says “The reality is that we have done all in our power and doing the same thing every day is not working” according to the SA Mail and Guardian newspaper. One could question Molewa’s resolve to combat poaching in the past, but she now seems resigned that no matter what is being “done” by the police, customs, Army, rangers, security guards, fences, etc – it is a losing battle.

 

So now Molewa, doubtless guided by the Private Rhino Owners’ Association, decided to push for legalizing the trade. In a coordinated campaign, many in the SA delegation sought interviews and organized events to push the message “more of the same [i.e. more of the same complacency] will not work”.

Pelham Jones even mentioned that “Anti-trade organizations are aiding and abetting illegal trade without a better solution” with typically convoluted reasoning. No mention, of course, was made of the complete shambles SA has made of proper investigations of the trade, catching those involved, adequately prosecuting those caught, and handing out stern and deterrent sentences. And that SA is actually responsible for the wave of poaching by allowing “pseudo-hunting” by Vietnamese and their proxies that created a supply and stimulated more demand.

Remember that rhino poaching was virtually non-existent before 2008. Over the five years 2006-2010 SA exported 394 trophies and horns to Vietnam legally, but this was obviously not enough.

Edna Molewa went on to state “The model that we have is based on pure law of supply and demand. Economics 101”.

 

But is it really?

 The laws of supply and demand of rhino horn, I’m sorry to inform Molewa, are anything but Economics 101 or 201 or 301. The level of demand is not known, and the numbers of people who will be demanding rhino horn if it is legalized is not known. For example, the acting head of Vietnam’s wildlife trade authority said it was “bullshit” that Vietnam was even a consumer. It all goes to China he said, despite significant evidence to the contrary of Vietnam as a major consumer of illegal horn. China says exactly the opposite, mentioning that there is no trade in rhino horn in China as it was made illegal in 2004 – again despite all evidence to the contrary including the existence of several rhino farms engaged in manufacture of pharmaceutical rhino products.

 

In this environment of denial and counter denial that there is a market for rhino horn in Vietnam and China coupled with an intense demand for “pseudo-hunting”, live rhino trade, and illegal trade in rhino horns, how can any level of demand be established?

Will Vietnam and China, who deny any consumption of horns and in fact say it is illegal to trade in rhino products, now suddenly wish to participate in the legal horn market?

 

And realistically, given that both China and Vietnam are likely involved up to their necks in the illegal rhino horn trade, how much horn would they demand if it becomes legal? There is no ready answer to that, but one can make some educated guesses. Despite lax enforcement, it is still not really that easy to shoot a rhino and transport the horn to Vietnam. Yet in 2012, in the region of 700 rhinos were poached in Africa to supply the illegal market (from SA, Namibia, Kenya, Zimbabwe etc). Demand is at present kept down because of the difficulty in obtaining the horn, and hence the price of rhino horn in Vietnam is currently estimated to be about $60-65,000/kg. Nevertheless, there is a thriving demand, and that demand will only grow if there is a legal supply. If the demand created by legalizing horn grows as expected in China and Vietnam, the supply from the 4,000 to 5,000 rhinos (of all ages) in SA private hands will not meet the demand, prices will go up, and poaching will climb again. 

 

Next, how will the market be regulated, and what will the sale price of legal horn be?

Certainly nowhere near the current black market price. However, if the legal price stays high it will not stop poaching as there is no incentive for poachers to halt their activities. After all, a poached rhino horn is priced in terms of the cost of obtaining it, which is minimal compared to the profit to be made selling it even if the legal price will be put at half or even 1/3 the current black market price. Elephants are being poached at a great rate even though the price per kilo of raw ivory is perhaps $4,000/kg. Poaching will continue as long as there is a profit to be made, and the legal price will have to remain high if the selling and buying governments can have any hope of limiting the demand. In other words, there is no way at all to undercut the illegal trade by placing legal rhino horn on the market.

 

I have mentioned elsewhere that the moves made to influence CITES delegates in Bangkok by SA delegates, the offered hosting of the next CITES convention in Cape Town, and the language emanating from SA politicians, highly placed officials and vested interest lobby groups all point to one thing. There will be tremendous lobbying and pressure applied to be able to sell rhino horns in the years to come.

 

Sadly, statements made by the Private Rhino Owners’ Association are clearly based on expected large profits rather than a well-thought out model to conserve remaining rhinos. What SA needs to do to limit poaching is to stop being complicit and complacent and take strong action. What China and Vietnam need to do is admit they are consuming illegal rhino horn and put real measures in place to stop trading in illegal wildlife products.

 

Some recent steps in the right direction to close loopholes in the “pseudo” trophy hunting trade were made at CITES. Initially, Ireland, on behalf of the EU and Croatia, supported by Kenya and Israel, proposed excluding all hunting trophies from exemptions for personal and household effects. This worried South Africa, Canada, Mexico, Namibia, Botswana and the Safari Club International. The proposal was watered down but still removes personal and household effects exemptions for rhino horn and elephant ivory and was accepted by the Conference. Since rhino trophy hunting permits are no longer extended by South Africa to citizens of Vietnam, this will also affect proxy hunters employed by Vietnamese in the Czech Republic, Poland, Denmark, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Thailand and the USA.

 

Before SA gets too far down the line with their fanciful proposals to satisfy the “demand” from China and Vietnam, all nations should ban the trade in rhino products. If that means a failed business model for the Private Rhino Owners’ Association, so be it.  Legalizing the horn trade will make financial profits for some, but will not profit the rhinos at all.

 

Picture credit: africajournalismtheworld.com

 

If you have not already signed up to our mailing list, you can add your name here and keep up to date with our ongoing work and, most importantly, financially support us to conserve the remaining fragile lion populations. Thank you.

 

Add a comment | Posted by Pieter Kat at 13:11

CITES Travesty Part 2: The grey trade in ivory - how legal is it?

                                                              No Chinese involved?

 


In 1989 the trade in ivory became illegal, and a ban was imposed. No more trade, no more sales.

 

CITES decided to overturn that ivory ban by allowing two sales of stockpiled ivory. In 1999 (ten years after Kenya burned ivory stocks in a protest against sales of ivory decimating elephants) CITES allowed the first legal sale to Japan, and in 2008 allowed stockpiles from Botswana, South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe to be sold to only two nations - Japan and China.

 

Those sales have been criticized as contributing to elephant poaching as there was now confusion as to whether ivory was legal or illegal. China still claims today that all in-country ivory sales from hundreds of ivory carving factories come from the 62 tons of “legal” ivory received in 2008. Others say that 90% of ivory sold in China comes from poaching.

 

Now comes another twist to this CITES story. After those two “one off” sales, CITES is still approving ivory to be exported to a number of countries. Trophy hunters successfully lobbied to have elephant trophies exempted as part of the CITES “personal and household effects” derogation, meaning that trophy hunted ivory had a special exemption from trade. Trophy hunters are not allowed to sell their tusks, but it is increasingly becoming apparent that this is exactly what is happening. After all, with a street value of $4,000/kg in China, who could resist making a quick profit?

 

Looking at the CITES trade database, it appears that in addition to such trophy hunted ivory, elephant tusks have been exported by the kilogram and individually – with no indication that such tusks fall under any exemptions.

 

For example, CITES numbers show the following:


1. Tanzania – 2005-2010 - 720 tusks exported (in addition to hunting trophies).


2. Namibia – 2005-2010- 437 tusks exported (in addition to hunting trophies).


3. South Africa – 2005-2010 – 90kg tusks to Portugal and 1100 tusks exported (in addition to hunting trophies).


4. Zimbabwe – 2005-2010 – 234 kg tusks to Austria, 17 kg tusks to Belgium, 90 kg tusks to Canada, 196 kg tusks to Germany, 2772 kg tusks to China, 51 kg tusks to Denmark, 22 kg tusks to Spain, 83 kg tusks to France, 33 kg tusks to UK, 32 kg tusks to Hong Kong, 150 kg tusks to Italy, 106 kg to Poland, 52 kg to New Zealand, 38 kg to Portugal, 124 kg to Qatar, 1834 kg to USA. Read those numbers carefully – those are all tusks sent by the kilo. In addition Zimbabwe exported 2446 tusks (in addition to hunting trophies).

 

So just those four countries have somehow managed to export 4704 tusks and at least 5924 kg of tusks in addition to their trophy hunting ivory exempted by the personal and household effects derogations?

 

Adding in the trophies, I would estimate that amounts to 6,800 elephants exported 2005-2010 from just four range states. You might say that’s not much compared to the 25,000 elephants poached in Tanzania over the past three years, but the difference is that these 6,800 elephants were all killed with some veneer of legality.

 

How is this allowed by CITES? Perhaps the recent and very controversial export of elephant calves to China by Zimbabwe can provide some indication. In that instance, Zimbabwe CITES authorities approved the export permits, approved the destination zoos, and stamped all necessary documents. The CITES Secretariat had nothing to say about the terms and conditions of this very dubious export and were in all likelihood not consulted. In other words, local CITES authorities are a power unto themselves and with their stamps can approve all manner of transactions that can at best be called very loose interpretations of CITES guidelines. Add some possible corruption to the mix and you end up with a poisonous recipe.

 

We perhaps see CITES as an organization setting rules so wildlife trade can be monitored and regulated. But the Achilles heel of this organization seems the local offices with their rubber stamps. As seen with the pseudo–hunting loophole provided by South Africa for rhinos and the subsequent stream of “legal” rhino horns to Vietnamese consumers, there is a lot wrong with this formula of devolved authority. 

 

We clearly identify poaching and illegal wildlife trafficking as crimes. Perhaps we should also be looking much closer at how the rubber stamps are abused. If CITES cannot control their own local authorities, how can they be expected to have any measure of success in preventing international trade abuse? 


 
Picture credit – Wikimedia Commons

 

If you have not already signed up to our mailing list, you can add your name here and keep up to date with our ongoing work and, most importantly, financially support us to conserve the remaining fragile lion populations. Thank you.

 

 

Add a comment | Posted by Pieter Kat at 12:04

Flawed economic models will not conserve elephants

                                                               Treat them like cattle

 

In a recent article in Forbes Magazine ,  contributor Doug Bandow sought to apply economic theories to the current elephant poaching crisis. Allow legal sales of ivory Mr Bandow claimed, and the poaching will disappear. I have problems with this concept (previously stated many times) and here will show you why economic models cannot be applied to the ivory trade, legal or illegal.

 

Mr Bandow makes the following points:


• The ivory prohibition has failed, and it is about as easy to stop elephant poaching as to stop drug use;
• Legalizing the trade in ivory would provide resources to governments, communities, conservationists, wildlife departments etc to improve protection;
• Legal sales would lower ivory prices, disincentivising poachers. CITES estimated that a population of about 500,000 elephants could naturally generate $6.7 billion worth of ivory annually;
• It is up to CITES to decide whether elephants must remain sacred and dead or commercial and alive.

 


The problem is much more complex than Mr Bandow realizes, and his Forbes Magazine contribution is not helped by his selective use of statements (even Richard Leakey, a primary opponent to any sale of ivory, is quoted out of context to benefit Mr Bandow’s case). Mr Bandow relies on his economist friends to score points, but does not include a single opposing statement by others well versed in the complexities of the ivory trade.

 

Mr Bandow also makes several economic mistakes.

 First, he assumes that the level of demand for ivory is known. This is a big error, as many have stated that China can this minute absorb all the ivory from every living elephant and more. And China is not the only Asian country interested in ivory – it is joined by Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korea to name but a few. And there is a great interest in ivory from Europe, Russia and the USA. If the level of demand is not known, how can Mr Bandow assume that any level of supply can satisfy that demand?

 

Second, Mr Bandow assumes to know something about elephants. This is a long-lived species with high intelligence and close family bonds. It is therefore difficult to “harvest” without unforeseen consequences to herd structure and future reproduction. Mr Bandow says that elephants need to be “treated like cattle”, and thereby exposes his complete ignorance. Harvesting a few elephants here and there to provide the demand for ivory is not at all like harvesting a few cows from a farmer’s herd.

 

Third, Mr Bandow does not understand the complexities of the ivory trade. He could have consulted the good article in the National Geographic Magazine written by Bryan Christy that clearly stated how the 2008 CITES approved ivory sale was manipulated by China – instead of lowering the price of ivory due to the windfall, the Chinese authorities both raised the price of ivory and limited sales to the Chinese buyers. This flies in the face of economic predictions – the Chinese demand a lot of ivory but will not lower the price once it is available. Therefore, illegal ivory is much cheaper, and the release of legal ivory into the Chinese market can be used forever to justify ivory sales as nobody is actually monitoring the volume of legal ivory sold in China (and elsewhere) versus the volume (legal and illegal) received.

 

Fourth, Mr Bandow quotes some completely irrelevant examples to support his thesis that “markets have been the key to conservation”. For example, he mentions that vicunas (a South American relative of the llama coveted for their fine wool) have recovered from near extinction due to captive breeding and non-lethal harvests from wild populations. And that crocodile numbers have recovered as well due to captive breeding – and then he goes onto very thin ice by mentioning that China is now “farming” tigers to supply body parts. Mr Bandow is now clearly showing both his economic and biological ignorance. The captive breeding of tigers to supply a market has not satisfied the demand by any means – wild tigers are still being poached, and now lion parts are being substituted to make up the tiger shortfall. Farming crocodiles and snakes for their skins (handbags, shoes, wallets) has not decreased poaching at all – it is much easier to kill a species in the wild than spend the many years waiting for it to grow up on a “farm”. I hate to be the one to break this to Mr Bandow, but one cannot farm elephants.

 

Fifth, Mr Bandow fails completely to factor into his economic equation the value of a live elephant versus a dead one. The latter is easy – you take the weight of the tusks, the meat value, and if you have a proper abattoir like the ones that used to exist in the Kruger National Park in South Africa, you can include the value of bone meal and canned meat. But what is the value of a live elephant? I’m not an economist (thanks be) but I can perfectly well make an estimate – after all, economics is not a precise science as small clues like the collapse of the world economy indicate. So let me do this simple evaluation. Kenya earns, conservatively, $500 million per year from overseas visitors who come to view wildlife. These people like to see elephants. Kenya has about 25,000 elephants, so each elephant is worth about $20,000 per year to Kenya. Elephants conservatively live about 40 years. So one elephant is worth about $800,000 during its lifetime to tourism in Kenya. A dead elephant is only valued in Kenya for the ivory – the carcass is left in the bush to rot away. Let’s say the dead elephant carried a generous 20 kg of ivory and ignore the fact that very small elephants are also killed by poachers. It appears that ivory on the street in China now has a value of $2200/kg. So a dead elephant is worth $44,000 in terms of ivory delivered to China and perhaps $100 to the poacher in Kenya. Do you see the difference Mr Bandow?

 

Sixth, Mr Bandow is completely accurate when he says three things:


• Realistically, there is no hope to convince Asian consumers to stop buying ivory;
• Virtually all large scale illegal ivory seizures do not result in any successful prosecutions;
• Countries with impoverished populations, incapable governments, corrupt officials, political instability, armed conflict, etc are powerless against any poaching threat.


Here is where all of us need to concentrate our efforts. Let’s just accept there is no satisfying the international ivory market with current stockpiles and future elephant culling/harvesting/gathering of tusks from elephants naturally dead. Let’s just accept that economic models of the ivory trade will be significantly wrong as they do not consider an appropriate number of variables. Let’s accept that even with a legalized trade, it will always be cheaper to poach an elephant than legally buy a tusk. Let’s accept that CITES (and the WWF who supported the CITES sale of ivory in 2008) cannot make a difference in the survival of elephants with their current flawed models. Let’s accept that some elephant range states are incapable of protecting their elephants. Let’s accept that the entire capability scenario of poachers has changed from a few people with guns to highly organized forces with considerable weaponry and logistics. Let’s request much better of people like Mr Bandow to write carefully considered articles rather than superficial and perhaps vested interest reports. Let’s call upon the editors of influential publications like Forbes Magazine to be a bit more demanding of the quality of publications.

 

And let’s ensure that commerce never dictates the value of an elephant.

 

Picture credit: Addoselfcatering.co.za

 

 

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1 Comment | Posted by Pieter Kat at 12:43

2012 - The annus horribilis for African wildlife?

Some of us might remember the speech by Queen Elizabeth to the nation and the Commonwealth when she referred to 1992 as the annus horribilis – the horrible year – referring to the break-up of two family marriages and one divorce within her family and a fire at one of her homes – Windsor Castle.

 

I believe we can also label 2012 as the annus horribilis for wildlife conservation in Africa. During that year, we were informed that over 650 rhinos were poached for their horns in South Africa, tens of thousands of elephants poached for ivory on the continent, lions killed for the value of their bones and trophies in increasing numbers and the list goes on. We also heard that the illegal wildlife trade is now only just behind drug and illegal arms trafficking in terms of profits.

 

We are realizing that wildlife is a commodity to be traded illegally by syndicates and legally by “pseudo hunters”. We learned that international organizations were scrambling to keep up but ultimately ineffectual to control the killings. How could they be when we also learned the extent to which officials in countries are involved in the illegal trade? And that militias and armies were funding their activities by the sales of ivory and rhino horns? And that some allege that the recent upsurge in rhino and elephant poaching in Kenya is attributable to candidates in the upcoming elections in March are filling their coffers?

 

More and more illegal ivory is being seized in Hong Kong, Singapore, the Philippines, Kenya, Malaysia. We are only just beginning to realize that for every one seizure, maybe nine reach their destination. Some estimate that four elephants are poached every hour to supply the insatiable demand for ivory. Some estimate that 80,000 elephants have been killed over the past three years. Photographs of the seized shipments include tusks that belonged to juvenile elephants.

 

So what have we learned? Quite a few sobering lessons. I have revised lion numbers down to about 15,000 on the African continent based on an analysis of the capability of range states to be able to maintain them based on a number of international indices like poverty, corruption, failed state ranking, wildlife department effectiveness, and perhaps most important the will of Governments to conserve their national wildlife heritage.

 

We have also learned, regrettably, that some major conservation organizations have become so corporate that they reward their executives a salary exceeding that of President Obama. We learned that hopeful contributions by their donors went to office expenses rather than wildlife. We learned that major conservation organizations have not been effective to stem the tide of illegal wildlife trade, and indeed some continue to support the outdated notion that trophy hunting contributes to conservation.

 

Most importantly, we learned that we have been complacent and perhaps even ignorant of the consequences of wildlife trade. We ignored trends facilitated by South Africa in terms of rhino poaching that has now spread to Namibia, Kenya, Tanzania. We ignored the fact that there used to be 10,000 Northern White Rhinos – all gone. We ignored the fact that there were over 200,000 lions in Africa 50 years ago – all gone except for maybe 15,000 survivors of habitat destruction, human/wildlife conflict and an immense toll from trophy hunting.

 

We must all accept a new formula. It will be difficult as the current trends of commercial poaching for bush meat, ivory, rhino horns and lion bones has become established to an extent perhaps beyond our comprehension. This was not a sudden development, it has been building for a long time. If we want to make a difference in conservation of African wildlife, we need to engage the African decision makers and the very people who consider wildlife as their heritage.

 

We need to engage and provide funding to those conservation organisations that have grasped the new realities, adopted new methods to deal with new threats, and above all, are not weighed down by a vast corporate infrastructure that swallows conservation dollars faster than you can say ineffectual.


2012 should be our last annus horribilis based on failed conservation formulas. We need to get smart, get real, and move forward.

Add a comment | Posted by Pieter Kat at 19:02

Conservation organizations fail conservation?

Wednesday 5th December 2012

Conservation organizations fail conservation?

Let’s look back over the past twenty years and celebrate the major successes that have made a real difference to the survival of species and world ecosystems. Like you I’m struggling here so let me backtrack while I think on this.

 

One of my favourite authors, V.S. Naipaul (above) hailing from Trinidad, was for a time a lecturer at Makerere University in Uganda. Famously, according to Paul Theroux, another favourite author, Naipaul was given the responsibility of assessing winners for the Creative Writing prize among his students. Naipaul declined to grant a First or Second prize, and only awarded a Third prize to the contestants. He said nobody was good enough to earn higher prizes.

 

Mr Naipaul was known as a perfectionist and a tough judge. He won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2001, and perhaps we can apply the Naipaul Principle to conservation. Sure, there are many individuals who win conservation prizes for their dedicated efforts. You might know their names and they are good people working tirelessly to ensure the species they are concerned with might have a future. In terms of real effectiveness Mr Naipaul would still perhaps give them his Third Prize in terms of overall efficacy.

 

Now let’s consider the NGOs that claim to have made a major contribution to wildlife conservation. There are big ones and small ones, and some are making a difference. But funding, according to the Naipaul Principle, is largely misspent. Leave alone the various president, vice president, assistant president, species presidents, financial officers, lawyers, public relation companies, office rents, meals, travel and sundry expenses, the amount spent on corporate maintenance versus species conservation beggars belief. One major NGO spent $50 million on “conservation grants” according to 2008 tax records, but an analysis indicates that $35 million of that amount was spent on maintaining international offices. Meanwhile they also spent $116 million on their own office and “functional” expenses. In total that organization spent 90% of received funds on their own operations versus conservation programmes.  Conservation has become business, and Mr Naipaul would give no prizes to such well established NGOs.

 

Turning to the international organizations, few have performed well. CITES has not maintained their promise to support the ban on international ivory trade, and that had led to the killing of 25,000 elephants over the past three years in Tanzania alone. CITES allowed South Africa to conduct rhino trophy hunting and the horns disappeared immediately into the illegal trade in Vietnam, home of “pseudo trophy hunters”. CITES allowed trade of hundreds of live rhinos from South Africa to very dubious destinations in Asia. CITES allows captive bred tigers in South Africa to be trophy hunted and live tigers to be exported to China where they are destined for the medicine pots. CITES allows a “personal and household effects” derogation to exempt lion trophies that constitute about 70% of lion offtake from any consideration of trade, meaning that CITES abrogates responsibility. Mr Naipaul will not be handing any prizes to CITES especially given the tragicomic charade at the last Conference of Parties (2010) in Doha and a likely repeat next year in Bangkok.

 

The IUCN does not see fit to consider genetic information to declare African forest elephants critically endangered. Nor do they consider western and central African lions similarly endangered  on the basis of their unique genetics. If the IUCN could be so motivated, they would make a big difference in funding priorities. The IUCN and another major NGO are opposed to the good Kenya initiative to place a moratorium on South African rhino trophy hunting (a major conduit into the illegal trade), mentioning that it will negatively affect income of private rhino owners. A strange decision given conservation and poaching concerns in other African countries – Kenya lost five rhinos poached just over the past weekend. Mr Naipaul would not be impressed with such apparent vested interest influence within organizations entrusted to keep a keen eye on species’ survival.

 

The International Whaling Commission has been somewhat effective in conserving whales. Despite all negative information concerning the impact of whale harvests, the IWC still allows offtake by Japan, Iceland and Norway for “scientific reasons”. But overall, the IWC gets a Naipaul Third Prize for trying hard and recently insisting that all decisions will be based on scientific information transparently made available to the public. 

 

So, who gets a First or Second Prize? Nobody. The failure of all organizations to make a tangible conservation difference over the past 20 years is sadly evident despite many hundreds of millions earned from donors. What is needed is a new formula; much better attention to scientific information, combating illegal offtake and a much better evaluation by the donating public as to the effectiveness of the organizations receiving their money. Mr Naipaul would say that heads need to roll in many organizations based on non-performance and betraying a public trust. But conservation organizations are not (yet) evaluated according to Mr Naipaul’s rules.

 

It is true that conservation of species and ecosystems is being presented with an ever-changing playing field – just look at the impact of commercial poaching on rhinos, elephants, lions, pangolins and sea horses, for example, to supply a seemingly insatiable demand for ivory and Traditional Medicine products in Asia. But the writing was on the wall for a long time. You can’t shape the future of conservation by relying on past formulas while poachers are using night-vision goggles and helicopters and big bribes for officials. Conservation efforts are due for a sea change if wildlife is to survive, and the Naipaul standard of performance must be applied.

 


Picture credit: thestockholmshelf.com

Add a comment | Posted by Pieter Kat at 16:50

Elephant and rhino poaching - big fish and little fish

Recently, a known elephant poacher (he was out on bail for a previous offence) was arrested for killing elephants in the Amboseli area in Kenya. He was released on KSh 50,000 bail – about $580. He allegedly remarked to a Kenya Wildlife Service officer that he would soon continue with his poaching activities.

 

Kenya has seen a dramatic upsurge in elephant poaching recently – not surprising as poaching is rampant in neighbouring Tanzania where it is estimated that 25,000 elephants have been killed for their ivory in the last three years. Recent ivory seizures in Hong Kong and Dubai emanate from both Tanzania and Kenya, shipped in containers from Dar Es Salaam and Mombasa.

 

Conservationists are not surprisingly up in arms about the light sentences being imposed on poachers in Kenya and are demanding better justice for those who are after all destroying Kenya’s wildlife heritage. I have long been saying that such light sentences are not unexpected, as the poachers themselves are only the first link in a long chain. A notorious poacher knows some of those links, and it could prove very embarrassing to follow the chain of evidence too far.

 

Coincidentally, a long awaited court case finally came to some sort of conclusion in South Africa. There, it involved a rhino horn trafficking syndicate. Let me introduce you to some of those in the dock:


1. Chumlong Lemtongthai, a Thai national who first came to South Africa under instructions from his bosses at the Xaysavang Import/Export Company in Laos to source a supply of lion bones. Two other Thai nationals were also sent to South Africa on the same mission, and were apprehended in Edenvale with 59 illegal lion bones. Punpitak Chumchon and Phichet Thongphai were fined R10,000 ($1,130). A further R100,000 fine ($11,300) and five years’ imprisonment was suspended if they left the country. Punpitak was arrested again at Johannesburg International Airport when he tried to sneak back some months later, presumably to assist Lemtongthai. Meanwhile, Lemtongthai discovered a legal loophole in the provision of rhino horns to his bosses in Laos – trophy hunting. He then set up a scheme whereby Asian nationals in South Africa – most notoriously a group of Thai prostitutes – would apply for rhino hunting permits. Once the rhino was shot, the horns would be sent to Asia, all perfectly legal under CITES regulations – but then ground up for medicine which is against CITES regulations. This went on for several years. Lemtongthai was sentenced to 40 years in prison (he was involved, coincidentally, in 40 rhino “hunts” and ordered 50 more before his arrest), but is appealing. We think, despite his guilty plea, he was set up to take the fall.

Lemtongthai could not have run the rhino operation on his own, and as an accomplice he found:


2. Marnus Steyl, a game ranch owner who sourced rhinos from auctions and/or breeders for the “pseudo” hunts. The “hunters” would send their passports to Marnus who arranged the permits. Steyl would then provide the “trophies” to Xaysavang through his South African company. Indeed, Marnus invoiced Xaysavang for such products to the tune of R1.734 million - $197,000. A video now widely available shows how such hunts were conducted – the “client” was taken along, Marnus shoots the rhino, the “client” poses with the dead rhino for some trophy pictures, Lemtongthai is also there. It is illegal for Marnus to shoot the rhino, but he does not care. Marnus owns hunting farms in the Free State, North West, and Eastern Cape Provinces and also has business interests in Dubai (interesting, as Dubai is a major transit hub for illegal wildlife trafficking). Marnus was granted bail when he was originally charged as being an accomplice in the rhino horn trafficking scheme in November 2011, but was then released and charges dropped at the trial in November 2012 for no apparent reason. The South African National Prosecuting Authority gave no explanation apart from a statement that the charges against Marnus were “circumstantial” – an explanation repeated when Gareth Morgan MP (Democratic Alliance) brought a question about his release to Parliament. Marnus, given his association with Xaysavang in Laos, might also be involved in the lion bone trade, but this remains unproven. But for rhino horns Marnus has/had some friends:


3. Under South African law, a professional hunter (registered with the Professional Hunter’s Association of South Africa) must accompany all rhino hunts. Marnus found a willing accomplice in Harry Claasens. Harry was not prosecuted as he gave State Evidence in return for immunity of prosecution. His evidence apparently did not extend to implicating his friend Marnus, and was all directed against Lemtongthai. It would not be surprising to us if Harry still has his professional hunter’s license. Meanwhile, Marnus had other friends:


4. Werner Boing is a Deputy Director of Enforcement and Permits in the Free State Department of Conservation. Werner issued a number of rhino hunting permits to Marnus on the basis of the Asian citizen applications, and also allowed Marnus to transport white rhinos out of the Free State to be hunted in North West Province. Werner should be investigated by his Department as he did not declare that he co-owned a hunting company, setting up the interesting possibility that he could issue licenses to himself. The other owner of Werner’s hunting company is Jaco Oberholzer, an officer of the HAWKS – an elite police unit that is charged with the scrutiny of wildlife crimes among other duties. Jaco says he resigned from the hunting company. Nevertheless, it shows Marnus’ tentacles reached out to many, perhaps including:


5. Unnamed officials in the various Provincial Departments of Conservation who issued the permits and are required by law to be present at all rhino hunts to verify all is legal. Perhaps they stayed away as they must have known that all Marnus’ hunts were illegal and were paid to turn a blind eye.


6. Less than two weeks after Marnus was excused of all complicity by the court, several rhinos were poached in Beestekraal, a location about 25km from Marnus’ house in Brits. That must be pure coincidence?

 

The South African court case basically resulted in the conviction of a “patsy” – Lemtongthai. But the case also reveals a glimpse of the remaining iceberg – Marnus’ connections that have been exposed to date – and there are doubtless many more.

 

Rhino horn traders and the ivory poachers operate by many links in a chain as I said above. The first link is the poacher, and if arrested that poacher can reveal the next link. Dedicated investigation will reveal the whole chain, but both in Kenya and South Africa there is a hesitation by prosecutors to go too far along the chain – who knows what official in high places might be implicated in the networks? Despite the long sentence passed to Lemtongthai, does this really indicate a seriousness on the part of the South African Government to get to the bottom of the rhino horn trafficking? As long as those who have information about the kingpins are given immunity from prosecution I would say we are only dealing with little fish instead of the sharks.

 

Picture credit: “Big fish eat little fish” – www.metmuseum.org

Add a comment | Posted by Pieter Kat at 11:55